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Task I: Status of PRI Finances in West Bengal Final Report 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Overview of the current system of local finance 
 
Rural government decentralization in West Bengal has been a focus of the state 
government since the state‘s 1973 Panchayat Act.  The three-tiered Panchayat Raj (PRI) 
system provides a role for governance at the district, block, and gram panchayat levels.  
The Government of West Bengal (GOWB) has been providing support and assistance to 
the PRIs to improve service delivery and governance.  To date, the perceived problems 
related to the PRIs include a lack of fiscal decentralization to the PRIs, a lack of untied 
and own source revenues and expenditure authority, limited capacity especially at the GP 
level for meeting public service demands, lack of modernization and computerization of 
budgets, expenditures, and receipts, and poor service delivery,   In the GOWB‘s endeavor 
to support further decentralization, DFID provides technical support to the GOWB 
through the program, Strengthening Rural Development (SRD).  The World Bank will 
provide similar support for improved PRI service delivery and governance to the GOWB. 
 
The next round of support for the PRIs in West Bengal will focus on a new or revised 
grant system to promote a ―better functioning GP system in the state‖ and ―improved 
institutional performance by targeted GPs‖.  DFID and the World Bank commissioned a 
series of studies to analyze the fiscal situation of the PRIs in West Bengal and develop a 
proposal for a new grant system.  This report for Task I provides an update on the status 
of PRI finances in West Bengal with a focus on the gram panchayat level.  Information 
presented in this report is complementary to information presented in the reports for Task 
II (an assessment of the current state of financial management and capacity of the PRIs 
and an assessment of PRI financial management reforms) and Task III (design of a fiscal 
transfer that will support the financing needs while also incentivizing the GPs to increase 
their service delivery and overall performance management), with some overlap among 
the three reports.  
 
The scope of this task did not call for a full updating and analysis of the fiscal situation of 
all GPs.  Instead, case studies of nine GPs, one block, and one district are used to provide 
up to date information on the finances of the PRIs in West Bengal, with a focus on the 
GPs.  Data from the PRDD are used to update the status of expenditures, revenues, 
opening and closing balances for all districts, blocks, and GPs.   The first field visits were 
made in July and the second were made in September, 2009.  In September, we also 
received financial reporting forms for 15 additional GPs from the PRDD in electronic 
format.  
 
The status of GP finances has not changed markedly since the 2007 Government of West 
Bengal (World Bank commissioned) study on PRI finances and Williamson‘s 2008 
report.  The PRIs are still focused on executing central and state sponsored schemes and 
most of the resources flowing to the PRIs are related to these schemes.  The total level of 
2                                               International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
  
expenditure made in the rural sector is small (on the order of 17 percent of total state, 
urban, and rural expenditures, GOWB, 2007).
2
  Discretionary expenditures are even 
smaller.  Own source revenues show some signs of increase since the 2007 GOWB 
analysis, but on a per capita level, in 2007-08, there were still less than 11 rupees per 
capita (GOWB, 2009).
3
 
 
Expenditure responsibilities have been partially devolved so that, for many expenditures, 
the district, block, and GP have some shared responsibility associated with numerous 
expenditure functions, but no tier of the PRIs have clear or exclusive authority over a 
functional category of expenditure.  The line ministries of the state continue to make a 
large share of expenditures, but the exact level is difficult to determine.  A recent 
accounting change has opened ―windows‖ in the state budget to help track the level of 
line ministry expenditures.  The ―windows‖ refer to state expenditures at the substate 
level, which are parallel to the PRI system.  For example, in the department of health, the 
window refers to the expenditures through district health offices, which are state 
employees and not part of the Zilla Parishad.  This accounting does not change practices 
or expenditures through the PRI system, but will provide information on the actual level 
of line ministry expenditures within the PRIs for five functional categories.  The main 
expenditure functions of the GPs are categorized as capital expenditures, but in practice, 
most expenditures are made for maintenance.  The total level of expenditures made at the 
GP level is small—on average 319 rupees per person in 2007-08.  However, this level has 
more than doubled since 2005.  Most of these expenditures (approximately 80 percent) 
remain non-discretionary.  Two main issues in the PRI system in this area are the lack of 
clarity in expenditure assignments and the lack of autonomy in expenditure decisions. 
 
Revenues of the PRIs are driven by schemes and grants from the central and state 
governments.  In 2007-08, central and state schemes and grants accounted for 96.6 
percent of PRI revenue—up slightly from 2005 (95.2 percent) due to increased transfers.  
Untied revenue—revenue from unconditional grants and own sources—was 18.9 percent 
in 2007-08.  If the Backward Region Fund Grant (BRFG) is categorized as an untied 
revenue source, untied revenue increases to 28.6 percent of total revenue.  In 2007-08, the 
total revenues of the PRI was 3,342 crore, approximately 514 rupees per person.  At the 
GP level, the average level of revenue per person was approximately 336 rupees.  About 
20 percent of those revenues are for discretionary use.  Two main issues in the PRI 
system in the area of revenue assignments are the high level of dependency on transfers 
(low own revenue effort of local governments) and the predominance of conditional 
grants over unconditional grants. 
 
The continued growth of central and state sponsored schemes dominates PRI finances in 
West Bengal.  While discretionary revenues (and expenditures) have grown since 2002-
03, tied grants and schemes have grown faster than own source revenue and discretionary 
expenditures. This pattern suggests that attempts to improve service delivery within the 
PRIs compete with increased non-discretionary expenditure obligations, perhaps making 
it difficult for the PRIs to focus on discretionary public expenditures.  Still, in interviews 
                                               
2  The population of the rural sector is about 72 percent of total population (GOWB, 2007). 
3  Per capita gross state product at the district level ranges from 868 to 1,562 rupees per person in 2005. 
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with PRI officials, they expressed specific additional needs in the areas of water supply, 
ground water management, health (clinics), and education (textbooks and repairs to 
school buildings).  All GPs interviewed were confident in their abilities to determine 
local needs and provide additional services.  Two main issues in the PRI system in this 
area are the increasing complexity of the grant systems and the lack of autonomy for 
local governments. 
 
 
Facilitating the design of a new grant program as a goal:  different prevalent views 
 
The review of PRI finances in West Bengal is one component of a number of studies and 
analyses designed by DFID and the World Bank to provide input regarding a new grant 
program in West Bengal.  The new grant is designed to phase in as the current DFID 
project (Strengthening Rural Development, SRD) phases out through 2011.  The new 
grant will be coordinated with the current SRD grant program and with the Union‘s 
Backward Region Grant Fund (BRGF).  States have some discretion customizing this 
grant, for example, in fine-tuning the formula for intra-state allocation.  Based on 
discussions with the World Bank, DFID, and the Government of West Bengal, the focus 
of the new grant is developing financial management capacity at the gram panchayat 
level to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.  The new grant is 
not aimed at equalization per se. Given that there are many ways to strengthen financial 
management with a goal to improving service delivery in the PRI system (focusing on the 
GP level) different stakeholders have expressed somewhat different visions of what the 
new grant should look like.  In particular, in the PRDD, a vision for the potential WB 
grant is to achieve four goals within the overarching goal of improved service delivery.  
Secretary MN Roy stressed the ability of the PRI system to work ―as a system‖ that is not 
interrupted by politics such as the recent elections.  The four goals of the new grant 
include: 
 
 Enhancing the capacity of the GP staff 
 Ensuring continuity of local service provision, despite election cycles 
 Improving political institutions at the local level concerning resource 
allocation 
 Addressing issues that are left out from the BRGF due to its conditionalities 
 
The PRDD and SRD staffs expressed concern that in some GPs general socio-economic 
conditions impede improvements in service provision.  These conditions included low 
revenue capacity, increases in population in some areas, increases in pension population 
in some districts, and participation of the population in gram sabha and other meetings.  
PRDD envisions a possible ―tiered‖ structure for the new grant system, with the tiers 
referring to levels of administrative and/or financial management competency from low 
to high.  There is some concern within PRDD that setting too high a bar in terms of basic 
competency will exclude GPs with low starting capacity although they might express a 
―willingness to advance.‖  These are GPs that in PRDD‘s opinion have shown effort in 
terms of financial management, computerization, and/or training. This concern can be 
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taken care of through a capacity development program to allow the poorest GPs to be 
integrated into the grant system. 
 
Based on discussions with the PRDD and field visits to the GPs, one vision of the format 
of the new grant is to view it as a multi-phase process where GPs could be started in 
different years.  For example, one group could begin Phase I in 2011 and another group 
could begin Phase II in 2012 (or 2013) and then Phase III groups in 2014 (2015):
4
   
 
 Phase I:  A two year phase that is focused on capacity building priorities 
(financial management and accountability) at the GP level.  Benchmarks at 
this phase might include:  an application to the new grant program with a 
narrative on the current limitations of the GPs to provide service delivery and 
(self-assessment of sorts regarding where the GP is in terms of service 
delivery and what it hopes to attain), attendance at PRDD (and/or SRD) 
sponsored training on financial management (get the list of what they train 
on), demonstrated consistent use of the 2007 GP Accounts, Audit and Budget 
Rules, evidence of regular gram sabha meetings (with attendance reported), or 
absorption of central and state sponsored scheme monies.  This phase could 
include GPs that easily make the benchmarks and those with application 
statements that articulate their problems in service delivery and needs.  
 
 Phase II:  A second two year phase with increased accountability and 
inclusion of the GUS level.  In this phase, the expenditure responsibilities 
might be expanded beyond the general devolution that exists currently.  
Benchmarks at this phase might include:  a significant increase in the self-
assessment score of the GP (15 percent increase, for example), evaluation of 
impact of projects at the GUS level (the SRD has a monitoring component 
that could be helpful in this assessment), and growth in own source revenues.   
 
 Phase III:  Finally, a third phase of three years that increases the flexibility of 
the GPs and GUS to provide services and increases ownership by the 
communities.  In this phase, the expenditure responsibilities of the GPs would 
be further expanded and funds increased, and the GPs would serve as mentors 
for those GPs not yet in the system. 
 
This type of sequenced processing of the grant system is important, but consensus on the 
goals and objectives of the grant system is paramount. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4  Design of the new grant system is the focus of Task III.  Discussion is provided here in the context of the 
field work undertaken for Tasks I and II.  Discussions with the World Bank suggested the program could be 
undertaken in three phases of four years each.  Finalization of the grant design is planned for December 
2009 in consultations with the PRDD, DFID, and World Bank. 
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Organization of this report 
 
This report for Task I is organized as follows.  The report provides an overview of the 
PRI system in West Bengal.  In the third section, information regarding the budget 
process is presented (which will be covered in greater detail in the report for Task II).  
The fourth section includes an analysis of PRI expenditures (with a focus at the GP 
level), providing information regarding mandated and de facto expenditure, and the 
revenues are treated in the fifth section.  Section six provides an analysis of the ability of 
the GPs to absorb additional funds and section seven presents an analysis of additional 
expenditure needs and potential impacts of the new grant system and a summary of the 
impacts of a $1 per capita and $2 per capita simulation follows. The conclusion 
summarizes initial observations regarding the state of PRI finances in West Bengal, an 
analysis of the level of truly ―discretionary‖ finance at the GP levels, and some 
alternatives related to the new grant.  
 
 
 
Overview:  Panchayat (PRI) Fiscal System in West Bengal 
 
The three tiered PRI system in West Bengal consists of 18 zilla parishad (ZP or districts), 
341 panchayat samities (PS), and 3,354 gram panchayats (GP).  In addition, there is a 
fourth tier, the gram sansads (GS, village level parliament) and their gram unnayan 
samities (GUS, village development committees), which are active participants in setting 
budget priorities and carrying out projects in some GPs.
5
 The 2001 Census reports that 
the rural population was 72.5 percent of the total population of West Bengal, and the 
projected rural population in 2009 is 65 million people.
6
 The average population of a ZP 
is estimated at over 3.6 million people, for the PS, 190,000, and for the GP the average 
population is 19,000.  Based on interviews in the field and with PRDD officials, the 
number of GS level bodies per GP range from 5 to 12 with populations on average of 
between 1,600 and 3,900.  This size is too small for effective service delivery of most 
public services, but this level can provide input into the overall budget development 
process.
7
    
 
Much of the structure of PRI finance is hierarchical whereby development and reporting 
on budgeting priorities and expenditure outcomes are done from the GP level up to the 
block and then to the district.  In some districts, there is active participation of the fourth 
tier—the GS level in the development of budget priority and as a distribution mechanism 
of the GPs.  Figure 1 presents the hierarchical scheme of the PRIs in West Bengal.  This 
is discussed in more detail in following sections. The central and state sponsored scheme 
                                               
5 Both GS and GUS are prescribed in the West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Administration) Rules, 
2004, Part-II, Chapter XI. 
6  Expanding Williamson‘s projections from 2008. 
7  In fact, most activities at the GUS level are carried out by ―self-help‖ groups and tend to be more private 
than public in nature.  These activities include development of very small business and livelihood activities 
such as a three-women catering ―company‖  or the purchase of livestock for a specific family. 
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revenues (the bulk of the PRIs‘ revenues) flow down from higher levels of government 
through various channels. 
Figure 1:  System of PRIs in West Bengal 
Zilla Parishad 
(ZP) Avg. Pop 3.6m  
Panchayat Samiti
(PS) Avg. Pop 190,000
Gram Panchayat
(GP) Avg. Pop 19,000 
Gram Sansad Gram Sansad Gram Sansad Gram Sansad
 
Source:  PRDD, SRD cell, presentation July 2009;  original SRD population figures based on 2001 levels, 
projected to 2009 levels using an annual average of 1.76 percent population increase. 
 
 
The PRI system is developed based on the Union Constitution and the 73
rd
 amendment to 
the Constitution (1993) which allowed for devolution of expenditures in 29 functional 
areas and set authority for revenue raising powers to local governments.  The 
corresponding West Bengal Panchayat Act amendment focused the decentralization 
efforts of the state. The Government of West Bengal more recently has published detail 
on the expenditure responsibilities of the PRIs along 15 functional areas (GOWB 2005).  
The West Bengal Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Accounts, Audit and Budget) Rules, 2007 
(GOWB 2007) is an important handbook for budget preparation, execution, and audit at 
the GP level. 
 
The budgets at all three levels are driven by the central and state schemes in terms of total 
revenues and total expenditures.  As noted in the GOWB 2007 report, grants and schemes 
account for 94.3 percent of revenue at the district level, 96.0 percent at the state level, and 
93.8 at the GP level and expenditure largely follow these revenue patterns.  Central grants 
and transfers make up the bulk of the total transfers:  87.6 percent of all revenues at the 
district level are from federal grants and transfers, 80.9 percent at the block level, and 
68.8 percent at the GP level.  Own fund revenues (and expenditures) are very limited and 
constitute less than 4 percent of all revenue across the PRIs in 2007-08 (Williamson, 
2008).  Districts and blocks have no taxing power but can impose various fees.  GPs have 
taxing authority including a land and building tax.  
 
As noted in World Bank (2007), PRI finances are also affected by the recommendations 
of the State Finance Commission regarding fiscal resources (own source revenues as well 
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as grants).  The Third State Finance Commission report includes a call for additional 
revenue sharing from the state to sub-state governments. The Government of West 
Bengal, Finance Department (Budget Branch, 2009) submitted their review of the 
recommendations.  Recommendation 8.5 states that the GOWB will increase untied funds 
flowing to local self-governments to 5 percent of state own net tax revenue—
approximately Rs. 800 crore, with annual increases of 12 percent.
8
  The GOWB has 
accepted the recommendation.  If the recommendation is enacted, it represents a tripling 
of untied funds flowing to local self governments in West Bengal.  The net impact on the 
state budget is substantial and there is no indication of the trade-offs that would be 
necessary at the state level to support such an increase. 
 
While the GOWB has issued strong support for many of the 3
rd
 SFC recommendations to 
increase revenue mobilization and grant funding for the PRIs, it is unclear how much of 
the increased sharing will actually happen in the coming years.  For example, the report 
of the Second State Finance Commission (2001) had recommended an untied transfer of 
16 percent of net state tax collections to the PRIs and municipalities (distributed on the 
basis of population shares, this calls for 11.5 percent of net state taxes to transfer to the 
PRIs and 5.5 percent to the urban bodies).   The 16 percent distribution was not justified 
based on expenditure needs and in fact, in the absence of detailed fiscal data for the PRIs, 
seems to have been set somewhat arbitrarily (GOWB 2007).  The State did not act on this 
recommendation and instead has set aside untied transfers based on the overall 
constraints of the state budget.  Based on the State‘s budget report, the State Finance 
Commission grant allocation was 0.85 percent of net state tax receipts in 2007-08.  In 
2008-09 the planned distribution was 0.96 percent and the revised estimate was 0.69 
percent, and for 2009-2010 the estimated expenditure is 0.83 percent.  Based on these 
figures reported in the State‘s budget, there has not been much movement in the percent 
of net state tax revenues allocated to the PRIs.
 9
 
  
The recommendations on the vertical transfer of the first two State Finance Committees 
were made with little reference to expenditure assignments between the state and the 
PRIs (and municipalities) (GOWB, 2007).  It could be the case that the Committee 
considered the unfulfilled needs of local government in making their recommendation.  
But good design and practice of transfer design requires to link transfers and revenue 
assignments to expenditure needs arising from existing and new assignments.  In the 
absence of analysis of the distribution of expenditures and their costs among the levels of 
government, it is difficult to say what a redistribution of 16 percent of state taxes implies.  
For example, Williamson (2008) notes that within the context of the overall state budget, 
the SFC recommended vertical share is possible only if the responsibility, funding and 
functionaries of major services such as health and primary education were truly devolved 
to the PRIs. 
                                               
8  Recommendations 8.6 and 8.7 provide for the distribution among local and rural bodies (24 percent and 
76 percent respectively); and among rural bodies (of the rural share, 12 percent to districts, 18 percent to 
blocks and 70 percent to GPs).   
9  http://www.wbfin.nic.in/.  Reasons given for the smaller disbursements include pressure to fund 
additional salary lines (given the new functionaries in the PRI system) and the inability of GPs in particular 
to use funds.  Utilization certificates that certify use of funds are used in some cases to determine the 
release of additional (remaining) funds. 
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PRI finances are also affected by other transfers from the state and transfers from the 
central government.  Financing for various schemes flows to the PRIs directly or through 
the PRDD.  These funds include categorical grants and untied funds and are summarized 
in a section below.     
 
In addition, the fiscal situation of the state government is important to the potential for 
increased autonomy and accountability of the PRIs.  Improvements in financial 
management and ultimately in service delivery at the PRI level requires stability and 
predictability in revenue sharing from the state (and through state agencies).  Several 
pieces of information point in the direction of an existing need to strengthen the state 
finances.   West Bengal has been often criticized for not adopting a Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management (FRBM) Act.  The Comptroller and Auditor General reports 
that the state ―lost‖ 547 crore in debt relief in 2007-08 because it had not passed the 
FRBM Act (Mint.com and the Wall Street Journal, 2009). The state budget speech notes 
that introduction of the FRBM would ―curtail the welfare role of the state government‖ 
(Government of West Bengal, 2009 p. 3). 
 
As reported in the state budget speech for 2008-09 and in the West Bengal Annual 
Financial Statement 2009-2010, and based on the budget documents for 2009-2010, the 
revenue deficit has fallen markedly since 1999-2000 when the revenue deficit was 90.95 
percent of revenue receipts.
10
  The 2007-08 revenue deficit was 27.01 percent and the 
estimated revenue deficit is 19.14 percent for 2008-09 (Government of West Bengal, 
2008 Budget Speech and West Bengal Annual Financial Statement 2008-09 and 209-
2010).  The fiscal deficit as a share of state domestic product has also fallen from 8.66 
percent to 3.75 percent (2007-08) and further to 3.71 (estimated 2009-10).
11
  Those gains 
in financial stability are important as the state looks forward to potentially expanding the 
amount of untied grants to the PRIs.  An often stated detractor on the state budget front is 
the level of non-discretionary expenditures (salaries, pensions, and interest payments), 
which are approximately 90 percent of revenue receipts (Government of West Bengal, 
2008).  Salaries and pensions will continue to put pressure on central and state 
government finances as larger numbers of the population face retirement age.  In one GP, 
Molandighi, we were told that their expenditures/funds under the National Old Age 
Pension Scheme (NOAPS) increased eightfold in the last two to three years.
12
   
 
The next sections summarize the budgeting process and current fiscal position of the 
PRIs in West Bengal and focus on the GP level.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
10  Revenue deficit is the level of revenue expenditures (non-capital expenditures) minus revenue receipts 
(tax and non-tax revenue). 
11  Fiscal deficit is the difference between total revenues and total expenditures. 
12  The pressure of non-discretionary expenditures was cited by Fitch Ratings India as area of concern 
regarding the state‘s credit profile (Economic Times 2009). 
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Budgeting, Banking, and Fiscal Management 
 
In-depth discussions of the budget process, banking and fiscal management system are 
reported in the report for Task II.  Here we provide a brief overview of the issues. 
 
The budget process is detailed in the 2007 GP Accounts, Audit and Budget Handbook.  
The budget system flows up from the lower tiers of government.  In West Bengal, the 
Gram Unnayan Samity (GUS) is a ward (village) level entity that serves as a spending 
unit of the GP.  The GUS is to be used to inform the GP budget process through meetings 
of the Gram Sansad.  Based on interviews with the GPs, there is not universal use of the 
GUS to provide inputs into the budget process.  GPs use various ways to notify the 
constituency of the budget process, actual budget, and outcomes associated with the 
budgets.  In the sample GPs interviewed, all GP officials provided information on how 
they disseminated information. There was a general consistency of this dissemination 
through printed pamphlets or leaflets. 
 
The GP budgets are sent to the block level not so much for approval of the overall budget 
but for approval for certain types of expenditures.  For example, where GPs receive the 
BRGF, the block reviews the suggested uses of funds and determines that the uses do not 
overlap existing schemes.  In cases where they do, the GPs are told to adjust the plans.  
The block budgets are also supplied to the districts for information and not for approval. 
 
Budgeting is annual at all levels and in the field visits conducted for this report, we find 
that in a majority of cases, the budget forecasts are based on the previous year‘s budget 
multiplied by some inflation factor.  There is no separate capital and current budget in 
practice.  Although the governments are not technically allowed to run deficits, the 2007 
GOWB report demonstrates that at the GP level, deficits exist.  For the field work 
conducted for that report, GPs responded that they ran deficits by posting some 
expenditures but not actually paying those expenditures (particularly late in the year) or 
by borrowing from upper level governments, but not posting the receipt of the ―loan.‖   
 
The flow of funds for the PRIs has been a focus of the state, and recent changes have 
been made to simplify the system and get money to the PRI as efficiently as possible.  
The physical flow of funds from the center and state to the PRI varies depending on the 
types of funds.  Generally the plan and non-plan grants from the state government and 
transfers to PS and ZP levels are through Local Fund Account. Funds related to CSS and 
other funds which flow to the blocks and districts from agencies are operated through 
specified banks accounts opened for separate schemes. 
 
At the GP level, there is no single account management.  The GP opens a separate bank 
account for each scheme and one for own-source revenue. In addition, each GUS, which 
is technically a spending unit of the GP, has a separate bank account. All national and 
state funds are routed through the district and/or block transit account (fund transfer or 
FT account) because, due to branch network coverage, all GPs cannot have accounts in 
the same bank. This arrangement also allows districts to play gatekeepers for schemes 
requiring district-wise utilization triggers. 
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 The audit process is prescribed in the 2007 rules handbook.  There is one external audit 
of the GPs and districts conducted annually and semi-annually for the blocks.  
Technically, there are also quarterly internal audits within the PRIs, but in field visits, it 
appears that these do not always occur. Finally, a GP self-assessment is made each year 
and results are published by the PRDD.  The PRDD also provides an incentive grant to 
GPs that do well and/or have shown significant improvement in the self-assessment.  The 
budget and audit processes are presented in greater detail in the report for Task II.  
 
The interim assessment of the SRD program pointed to a somewhat higher participation 
in Gram Sansad meetings in SRD districts versus the control group (non-SRD districts) 
and higher utilization of centrally sponsored schemes.  This may reflect more 
accountability associated with the focus on the GUS and GP levels in the SRD districts.   
 
The next two sections focus on the expenditure and revenue assignments of the PRIs in 
West Bengal, with a focus on the GPs.   
 
 
 
Expenditures 
 
The GOWB 2005 Activity Map identifies the responsibilities by PRI level for 15 
functional areas.
13
 The structure of the activity map is found in Table 1 below (reporting 
two out of seven activities for illustration, Appendix Table A1 includes all seven 
activities).  Based on this activity map, the PRIs are given little authority to set policy 
regarding expenditures.  Instead, the PRIs carry out schemes and perform a hierarchical 
set of duties for specific activities associated with a particular service delivery.  Functions 
are not assigned primarily to any level of PRIs. The activity map also prescribes the ZP, 
PS, and GP level official responsible for the particular component of each activity within 
the 15 areas.  As pointed out by the GOWB (2007), Williamson (2008), and others, the 
resulting expenditure assignment is more a devolution of expenditures than assignment of 
responsibilities to the PRIs.  As a result, much of the PRI expenditure activity is focused 
on carrying out and reporting on prescribed central and state sponsored schemes.   
 
The de facto expenditure assignment is identified in the distribution of actual 
expenditures by the PRIs.  Based on information from the GOWB (2007), the share of 
expenditures made by the PRIs from 2002-2005 were quite small—about 17 percent of 
total expenditures of the state, urban, and rural governments were made by the PRIs.
14
 
Per capita, as of 2005, urban governments spent three times as much as rural 
governments (GOWB, 2007).   
                                               
13 These are:  agriculture and extension works, animal resources, cottage and small scale industries, health 
and family welfare, forestry, women and child development, food and supplies, fisheries, backward classes 
welfare, mass education extension (including library services), information and cultural affairs, school 
education, public health and engineering, water investigation and development, and land/land reforms 
(GOWB, 2005). 
14  The share of PRI population is approximately 72 percent.  Currently, there are no more recent data on 
urban finances. 
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Within the rural sector, the distribution of expenditures among the three tiers has 
remained relatively stable since 2002-03.   In 2005, the districts spent on average 156 
rupees per person, the blocks, 95 rupees per person and the GPs spent 138 rupees per 
person.  In 2007-08, the GPs expenditures more than doubled to 319 rupees per 
person.
15
GOWB (2007) reports that within districts, blocks, and GPs there are significant 
disparities in per capita expenditures.  All PRI expenditures range from 231 rupees per 
capita in Murshidabad district to 726 rupees per capita in Koch Bihar district (in 2005).  
By level of PRI, among GPs, the variation in expenditures per capita ranged from 14.9 
rupees per capita to 1,423 rupees per capita; among blocks the range was 14.7 to 396; and 
among districts the range was 68.7 to 288 rupees per capita (GOWB, 2007). 
 
A comprehensive statement of PRI expenditures by type is not found in the otherwise 
quite complete PRDD Annual Report.  This makes it difficult to provide updates on the 
total level of spending among the PRIs and the composition of that spending by function.  
However, since most spending is tied to the central and state schemes, the composition of 
expenditures is difficult to separate from the composition of revenues at all levels of the 
PRI system.  The Annual Report provides information on release and expenditure by type 
of funding for major schemes and grants but does not provide detail on the actual 
expenditure of untied revenues and some grants (BRFG and SRD grants for example).  
 
Based on the comprehensive data presented in GOWB (2007), districts spend 85 percent 
of their budget for capital expenditures while the share for blocks and GPs is about 60 
percent (see Table 2).  However, as noted in GOWB (2007), the capital assets provided 
by the PRIs are more often public works projects and employment schemes so that 
expenditures are more akin to current expenditures.  This use of funds was borne out 
again in the field visits conducted for this report.  In a few cases, GPs reported producing 
buildings and long-lived assets but these were reportedly produced using own fund 
revenue and not revenue from the larger schemes.   
 
There is a specialization of expenditure patterns among the PRIs.  Data from GOWB 
(2007), reported in Table 3, demonstrate that the districts focus their expenditures on 
housing, infrastructure, and employment generation, which are expenditures aligned with 
the central and state schemes.  Block expenditures are more heavily focused on education 
than the other tiers, but also expend large portions of their budget on infrastructure and 
employment generation.
16
  At the block and district levels, a relatively small share of 
expenditures are made for administration.  The GPs expenditure focus is on housing, 
employment generation, and administration.  These expenditures are a result of the 
mandates associated with the IAY housing program, the SGRY employment program, 
and the salary grants passed down from the upper tiers of government.  The lack of 
concentration of PRI expenditures on important areas such as education is due to the 
presence of the line ministries in the rural areas.   
                                               
15  Estimated based on Williamson (2008) Table 3 and adding 90 percent expenditure from own fund 
revenues and the BRFG (estimate waiting for data to confirm level of usage). 
16  Blocks administer the mid-day meal program, which is categorized as an education expenditure in these 
data. 
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Interviews conducted during the field visits focused on the financing at the GP level.
17
  
Based on interviews, there has not been much change in the types of expenditures made 
by the GPs or in their interpretation of their basic activities over the past three to five 
years.  There was a recognition of somewhat increased own source revenues, which gave 
the GPs some additional fiscal ―room‖ for expenditures.  But, the perceived size and 
importance of that additional room varied by GP.  The overwhelming focus of budgetary 
expenditures comes from the various schemes and much of the work of the GP is focused 
on these schemes.   
 
To analyze the actual expenditures of the GPs in 2008-09, we rely on a variety of reports 
that we obtained during the field visits.  To understand the distribution of expenditures 
(and revenues) at the GP level, it is important to understand the details of those reports.  
Ultimately, these data will be computerized and the budgeted and executed revenues, 
expenditures, and accounting should be consistent among GPs, blocks, and districts.  This 
is not yet the case (as described below).
18
 The reports are as follows and the sample GPs 
use of them is reported in Table 4:
19
  
 
Form 27:  Statement of Receipt and Payment:  This report provides receipts and 
payments by major subject heads, opening balances, amounts received/spent during the 
period, total amounts, and closing balances.  The report should represent the executed 
budget of the PRI (GPs in the cases reviewed here).  Form 27 reports do not provide a 
high level of detail on individual receipt and expenditure items.  In the case of some GPs, 
fund transfers are specified, in other GPs they are subsumed under other headings and 
adjustments are not separately identified.    This is important because the total reported 
level of revenue should be net of adjustments PRDD methodology used to calculate fund 
utilization rates, adjustments are double counted in the gross receipt and expenditure 
figures.  To get a good picture of the tax effort of a GP, for example, own source revenue
                                               
17  The nine sample GPs are:  Thalia (Amta-II block, Howrah district), Bankra III (Domjuur block, Howrah 
district), Malangihi (Kanska block, Burdwan district), Maszidpur (Galsi II block, Burdwan district), 
Shyamsundar  (Raina I block, Burdwan district), Jasohari Anukha II (Kandi block, Murshidabad district), 
Jamuar (Rathunathganji I block, Murshidabad district), Sammatinagar  (Raghunathganji II block, 
Murshidabad district), and Jotkamal (Raghunathganji II block, Murshidabad district).  Also interviewed 
were officials from Kandi and Nabagram blocks and Murshidabad district.  In addition, data from 13 GPs 
were obtained from the PRDD and are included in analyses below. 
18  The extent of computerization in the five sample GPs is presented in Box 1. 
19  The dates of coverage of all of the computerized forms we were shown can be tailored monthly or 
annually on a fiscal year basis. 
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Table 1:  Sample Activity Map Detail Function 4 Health and Family Welfare 
 
Function Activity Responsibility of Standing Committees of three-tier PRIs 
  Zilla Parishad:  Chief 
Medical Officer of 
Health 
Panchayat Samiti: Block:   
Block Medical Officer of 
Health  
Gram Panchayat: Health 
Supervisor 
Improvement in 
Infrastructure 
Upgrading 
facilities at Sub-
center 
 Civil works for 
improvement of 
infrastructure  (large 
size outlay) 
 Maintenance and 
upgradation of BPHC 
and PHC  
 Maintenance and upgradation 
of Sub-centers  
Supply of 
Materials 
Procuring 
materials and 
distribution 
 Fund allotment 
 Lifting of materials 
from State Hqtrs and 
supply to different 
block 
 Supervision and 
monitoring of 
utilization of funds and 
materials by BPHCs 
and PHCs 
 Local Purchase of non-
medical items required 
by the PHCs and 
BPHCs as may be 
authorized by H&FW 
Department 
 Supervision and monitoring of 
utilization of funds and 
materials by Sub-centers 
 Local Purchase of non-medical 
items required by the sub-
centers as may be authorized 
by H&FW Department 
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Table 2:  Capital and Current Expenditure Shares by PRI (2005) 
 
 Capital Current Total 
Districts (N=17) 85.50 14.50 100 
Blocks (N=288) 62.41 37.59 100 
Gram Panchayats (N=3,016) 63.16 36.84 100 
Total 63.40 36.60 100 
 
Source:  GOWB (2007). 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Expenditure Shares by PRI Type (2005) 
 
 Education Housing Infrastructure Employment 
Generation 
Panchayat 
Administration 
Other 
Districts (N=17) 1.6 18.1 28.6 30.6 3.9 17.2 
Blocks (N=293) 15.2 2.9 20.8 28.3 3.8 29.0 
Gram Panchayats (N=3,082) 0.9 30.1 6.2 24.8 25.4 12.6 
Total 2.1 27.7 7.6 25.1 23.5 14.0 
 
Source:  Based on GOWB (2007) Table 3 with adjusted categories. 
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―adjustments‖ are not an appropriate component of tax effort and should be subtracted.20  
Since not all GPs currently provide that level of detail, it is difficult to get a consistent 
picture on revenue and expenditure items across the GPs.  The fund transfer is also 
problematic since it is large in some GPs and is not attributed to a specific fund. 
 
Form 26:  Monthly Statement of Fund Position:  This report provides the following 
information on a monthly basis (―fund position as on Day-Month-Year‖): 
 
 Balance of fund at the beginning of the month 
 Fund received during the month 
 Total fund available 
 Payment made during the month 
 Balance fund available 
 Payment Commitment 
 Net Balance 
 Remarks 
 
This report provides information on the flow of receipts and expenditures.  An analysis of 
Form 26 for a consecutive set of months helps to provide information on the timing of 
flows of grants, scheme funds, and own revenues.  Aggregation is at a relatively high 
level, but individual schemes are listed separately. 
 
Compiled Collection and Expenditure Report (CCER):  This report provides the most 
level of detail on expenditure and revenue amounts, opening balances, and closing 
balances by ledger head.  Ledger heads include: 
 
 12th Finance Commission 
 2nd State Finance Commission 
 NREGS 
 IAY 
 GP Staff Salary 
 GP Tax Collector Allowances 
                                               
20 Adjustments and transfers are found in many of the GP accounting reports that were analyzed for this 
report.  Our understanding of these is that they are accounting transactions within the GP budget and 
transfers should be included in net expenditure and receipts figures but adjustments should not.  For 
example, an adjustment can be logged when in the course of the fiscal year, funds are borrowed from 
another account (e.g., own source) and then when the scheme moneys arrive they would pay it back to the 
account used as a temporary source. Another possible explanation for the adjustment transactions is settling 
advances to the GUS levels. The GUS first receives an advance from GP to an operational account and then 
when the project is competed a balance might have to be returned to the GP account.  Fund transfers are the 
internal transaction from the (transit) Fund Transfer Account to the scheme specific accounts.  Until 2009, 
the sector funds were wired to this single transit account of the GP, and then the GP would have to transfer 
the funds to the appropriate earmarked account. The PRI stopped this practice because money would sit in 
the Fund Transfer account as the GP would not know for what scheme a particular payment was that hit 
their account.  Consistency in the definition and accounting of these transfers is very important for the 
usefulness of data that are currently in development in the PRDD GPMS. 
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 Own source revenues 
 
The number of ledger heads and details within the ledger heads varies among the GPs 
sampled for this report.  The GPs did not articulate an understanding of a mandate (or 
even need) to produce the report with a specific level of detail.  Rather, we were told by 
the GPs that this report was tailored by the GP itself.  This again is problematic as the 
details on particular funds (including own source revenue), transfers and adjustments, and 
―other‖ categories are necessary to analyze the fiscal situation across GPs.  This report 
also includes a bottom line ―analysis.‖  The following items are reported: 
  
Total expenditure Total revenue 
Closing Balance Opening balance 
All Total All Total 
  
Actual Payment Actual Receipt 
Available Fund Utilization % 
  
Total expenditure and total revenue include all transactions reported in the 
CCER (including adjustments and fund transfers) 
Actual payment = total expenditure – adjustments 
Actual receipt = total receipt – adjustments 
Available fund = actual receipts + opening balance 
Utilization % = (actual payment/available funds)  
 
 
The Form 27 report and CCER are used to provide a detailed breakdown of actual GP 
expenditures for the field sample GPs.  The data in Table 4 summarize the distribution of 
expenditures for major schemes and grants, and for untied revenue.
21
  The main theme of 
the earlier expenditures is repeated in these GPs—most of the expenditure is made on 
non-discretionary schemes.   
 
The distribution of expenditures by general ledger head (which are aligned most closely 
with plan and non-plan revenues on Form 26, 27 and the CCER) for 2008-09 for the field 
sample of GPs plus those GPs for which data were received directly from PRDD is found 
in Table 5.
22
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21 The BRFG and SRD grant do not exist for the five GP sample.   
22  To maintain consistency with PRDD‘s utilization percentage, we exclude major adjustments from these 
calculations.  We report the transfer fund if it is reported as separate item in the GP accounts.  
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Table 4:  Field Sample GPs Use of Standardized Reporting Forms 
 
GP Form 26 Form 27 CCER 
    
Thalia Yes (June 2009) Yes (FY 2008-09) Yes (FY 2008-09) 
    
Maszidpur Yes (June 2009) Yes (FY 2008-09) Yes (FY 2008-09) 
    
Malangighi No 
We were given a 
hardcopy of a budget 
for 2008-09  
No 
GP officials stated that 
is being used, but they 
could not produce it 
No 
We were given a 
hardcopy of a 
statement of 
executed revenue 
and expenditures 
for 2008-09, in 
Bengali 
    
Shyamsundar Yes (June 2009) Yes (FY 2008-09) Yes (FY 2008-09) 
    
Bankra III Yes (April, May, 
June 2009) 
Yes (FY 2008-09): not 
computerized 
Yes (since April 
2009) 
    
Jasohari 
Anukha - II 
Yes (as of Aug. 31, 
2009) 
Yes (FY 2008/09) GPMS installed on 
April 1, 2009 
    
Jamuar Not available  Yes (FY 2008/09, 
pages missing; FY 
2009/10 year to date) 
Yes 
    
Sammatinagar Yes (as of June 
2009) 
  
Not received Not received 
    
Jotkamal  No We were given a 
hardcopy of the 
budget 2008-09/09-
10 
Not received Not received 
    
 
 
As seen in Table 5, the concentration of GP expenditures in 2008-09 is in the area of tied 
schemes, and in particular the IAY and SGRY expenditure area.  In the cases of Bankra 
III and Malandighi, detailed data from the CCERs was not made available by the GPs, so 
we cannot be sure that the adjustments are netted out. The average tied expenditure share 
is 76 percent, with a range between 59 percent (Majdia) and 89 percent (Totopara).  
Expenditures made out of own source revenues are small in these GPs—on average, 3.9 
percent of expenditures come from own fund sources.  However, one GP, Jhamtia, 
reports nearly 15 percent of expenditures from own fund sources. 
 
The data in the next table (Table 6) provide a breakdown of the concentration of 
expenditures out of particular schemes and grants by GP for the sample GPs.  Within the 
tied revenue sources, most expenditures are made out of four funds: IAY, 
NOAPS/IGNOAPS, NREGS/WBREGS, and Mid-day meals (with adjustments netted 
out).  These four expenditures account for, on average, 92 percent of total tied 
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expenditures in the sample GPs (with a range of 67 to 99.8 percent).  The concentration 
of these schemes in GP expenditures among the sample GPs is varied. The employment 
scheme, NREGS/WBREGS, dominates tied expenditures for 14 of the GPs, but the 
housing scheme, IAY dominates in five GPs.  Based on information received during field 
visits, these differences in concentration reflect to some extent local demands (or 
articulated demands) for housing in Thalia and Bankra and the relative number of 
pensioners in different GPs.  In Thalia and Jhamtia, the mid day meal program 
expenditures are out of line with the norm found in the GOWB 2007 study, where mid 
day meal expenditures were allocated to the block level.  This may reflect some 
reallocation of responsibilities and is worth further investigation. The general pattern of 
expenditures found in Table 6 is similar to that reported from the earlier studies—GPs 
focus on employment generation and housing. 
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of Major Expenditures in Sample GPs by Ledger Head 
(% of total expenditures, 2008-09) 
 
 GP TIED UNTIED OSR SALARY TOTAL 
THALIA 73.1 13.1 1.8 12 100 
SHYAMSUNDAR 87.6 5.5 3.9 3 100 
MASZIDPUR 85.5 5 1.7 7 100 
BANKRA III 60.1 15.4 10 15.9 100 
MALANDIGHI 85.9 5.9 2.3 6 100 
CHAUHATTA 76.9 14.9 2.9 5.4 100 
DASKALGRAM 75.1 9.6 2.7 12.5 100 
DOMOHANI 71.4 15.5 3.7 9.3 100 
HATIA 78.1 12.3 1.3 8.3 100 
JHAMTIA 63.7 8.1 14.6 13.6 100 
KHARIA 65.6 20.3 2.2 6.0 100 
KIRNAHAR 81.7 8.5 3.3 6.4 100 
KURUNNAHAR 86.3 5.3 0.8 7.6 100 
MAJDIA 58.9 10.4 8.8 21.2 100 
PADAMATI 67.6 17.7 1.3 13.3 100 
PURANDARPUR 74.4 13.9 2.7 9.0 100 
SARPALEHANA 83.9 5.0 2.7 8.4 100 
SATTOR 77.3 9.3 5.7 7.1 100 
TOTOPARA 88.8 3.6 1.9 5.6 100 
 
Sources:  GP Forms 27 and CCERs received July, 2009, September 2009, and GPMS from PRDD. 
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Box 1: Computerization of Fiscal Information 
 
The State has made gains in the area of computerizing the fiscal information of the PRI 
system at the same time that they have institutionalized and rationalized the budgeting 
process and fiscal reporting (using the 2007 Accounts, Audit and Budget Rules).  
Fiscal management software systems were developed under the direction of the PRDD 
to allow information on revenues and expenditures of the three tiers of the PRI to be 
aggregated at ―head level‖ and reports produced on the level of revenues and 
expenditures.   
 
The systems are currently operational in all districts and in all but 22 blocks.  The GPs, 
which have a separate system (Gram Panchayat Management System, GPMS), have 
lagged behind due to accessibility, training, and a willingness to participate.  Currently, 
2,000 GPs ―have‖ the system which means that they have a computer and the software 
in a GP office.  Of these 2,000, PRDD states that 700 GPs are using the system on a 
timely basis.  Officials interviewed in the sample GPs indicated receiving from 3 to 5 
days of training--some GPs received training from the block and some from the district 
levels on the use of the GPMS.  Technical assistance from the state is available, 
however it was noted in one GP that a state technical assistant oversees 40 GPs, so it is 
not always possible to get help quickly.    
 
The PRDD has produced examples of the type of analysis possible with the financial 
management information system.  They have used in part the 2007 GOWB study on 
PRI finances to fashion the fiscal analysis.   
 
The system has moved financial management a long way forward.  The ability of the 
PRDD to analyze expenditures and revenues at each level of the PRI is critical to 
monitoring initiatives within the system, to identify needs for further reforms, to access 
the stability of the PRIs on all levels.  The system is not ―there‖ yet since many GPs are 
not yet computerized and remain unable to interface with the system.  Also, the system 
is not currently web-based. 
 
The financial management information system could also be used for budget 
preparation, but that is not part of the functionality at this time.  One GP (Thalia) 
produced a spreadsheet ―model‖ for their budget, using the 2007 GP Account, Budget 
and Auditing Rules.  Other GPs presented hardcopies of their budgets produced in the 
local language.  These were not available in softcopy. 
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Table 6: Distribution of Expenditures from Tied Revenues in Sample GPs 
(% of total tied expenditures, 2008-09) 
 
 
  IAY 
NOAPS/ 
IGNOAPS 
Midday Meal 
NREGS/ 
WBREGS 
4-Scheme 
Share of Total 
Tied 
Expenditures 
THALIA 51.3 9.8 14.3 10.3 85.7 
SHYAMSUNDAR 8.3 2.5 
Not separately 
reported 
87.3 98.1 
MASZIDPUR 7.2 7.3 6.5 74.9 95.9 
BANKRA III 68.2 17.3 
Not separately 
reported 
6.4 91.9 
MALANDIGHI 11.7 4.1 
Not separately 
reported 
69.1 84.9 
CHAUHATTA 7.0 11.0 0.0 77.0 95.0 
DASKALGRAM 6.0 15.0 0.0 75.0 96.0 
DOMOHANI 16.0 21.0 
Not separately 
reported 
60.0 97.0 
HATIA 12.0 19.0 0.0 56.0 87.0 
JHAMTIA 38.0 19.0 27.0 8.0 92.0 
KHARIA 39.0 21.0 
Not separately 
reported 
39.0 99.0 
KIRNAHAR 4.0 9.0 0.0 87.0 100.0 
KURUNNAHAR 0.0 10.0 0.0 87.0 97.0 
MAJDIA 63.0 29.0 0.0 7.0 99.0 
PADAMATI 14.0 22.0 0.0 63.0 99.0 
PURANDARPUR 19.0 9.0 0.0 71.0 99.0 
SARPALEHANA 11.0 8.0 0.0 48.0 67.0 
SATTOR 6.0 10.0 0.0 61.0 77.0 
TOTOPARA 4.0 2.0 0.0 87.0 93.0 
 
Source:  GP Forms 27 and CCERs, received July, 2009, September 2009, and PRDD GPMS. 
 
Note:  NREGS/WBREGS in Kirannahar is the value for NREGA-WB 
 NREGS/WBREGS in Sarpalehana includes the value (17%) of NREGA 
 NREGS/WBREGS in Sattor is the value for NREGA 
 
 
One of the most diverse set of expenditures comes from the own fund of GPs.  As noted 
earlier, the size of the own fund is quite small—between 0.8 and 15 percent of total GP 
expenditures in the sample GPs.  However, this is the fund where GPs have the most 
latitude to make their own budgetary decisions.  Some might argue that this discretion is 
reduced because of the constraints associated with the GP staffing requirements and the 
expenditure pressures of the various grants and schemes that might impose costs in terms 
of maintenance and operation of these programs. 
 
                              Status of PRI Finances in West Bengal Final Report                                 21  
 
For a number of the sample GPs, we obtained a detailed list of own revenue fund 
expenditures.  The own fund expenditures are largely focused on operational expenses 
(electricity, telephones, equipment) and maintenance and development (road building, 
supplements to tubewell development, school building maintenance and repair). The top 
10 expenditures from own funds are reported in Table 7 for the sample GPs for which 
data are available.
23
  As seen there, there is some diversity in specific own fund 
expenditures.  Maszidpur and Chauhatta GPs use the largest share of their funds for 
development in terms of roads and tubewells and other development, while Thalia is 
focused on current operations expenditures.  Shyamsundar and Padamati have the largest 
miscellaneous category, which makes it difficult to describe their emphasis in own fund 
expenditures.
24
  Jhamtia focuses most of its own resources on sanitation. 
 
Based on this analysis, one observation is that the GPs do express local tastes in terms of 
own fund expenditures, and there are substantial differences in their investment.  
However, given the overall size of own funds, which are small, the distribution of actual 
own fund expenditures are very much constrained.  Investment expenditures may be a 
luxury in many GPs due to relatively high start up costs.  
 
Expenditures attributed to the 12
th
 Finance Commission and untied funds from the state 
also provide some insight into the expenditure choices the GPs are making. The 12
th
 
Finance Commission grant does impose some restrictions on use in that the focus is 
supposed to be existing assets. For most of the sample GPs, the expenditure choices 
associated with these funds are not detailed in Form 27, 26 or the CCER.  In Thalia, the 
12
th
 FC grant is reportedly used for tubewell material, road construction, and labor for 
projects.  In the case of untied state funds, Thalia GP reports ―untied wage and materials 
payments.‖  In Daskalgram and Sattor, the GPs report that most SRD expenditures are 
related to planning.  However, there is no detail regarding the planning expenditures. 
 
In interviews with the sample GPs, the GP officials expressed needs that could not be met 
with current tied or untied revenues.  In five of the GPs, we were told that the list of 
needs and projects came from discussions from the GUS level up to the GP.  References 
were made to needs for disaster relief (repair of buildings damaged in frequent storms), 
additional health services (especially primary clinic facilities), and water management 
resources (drainage, water supply).  The focus of the GP officials was (understandably) 
on expenditures that would improve the basic quality of life and there was no discussion 
in the five GPs of improving conditions for employment.  
 
The list of activities that officials wished to carry out was not constrained by 
interpretations over expenditure assignments in that the GP officials did not              
express concern that new expenditures would conflict with their authority to carry out 
those expenditures.  However, in no GP was there a call for significantly increased 
expenditure  authority  over  a functional area.  The discussion was very much in terms of  
                                               
23  Excluding fund transfers and adjustments. 
24  For Bankra, the CCER for April 2009-June 2009 was available and this reflects own revenue fund 
expenditure focus on tubewell labor and material, road repair, printing, and commission to the tax collector. 
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Table 7:  Largest Own Fund Expenditures 2008-09 
(percent of total Own Fund Expenditure) 
 
Shyamsundar  Maszidpur  Thalia  
Office equipment 121.9 
 
 
Road maintenance/ 
repair 
24.2 
 
Telephone bill                              14.3
Miscellaneous 17.8  Own fund 626 13.1  Car expenses                                13.7
School building 
maintenance 
5.9 
 
Sports and Festival 10.1 
 Commission of 
tax collector        
11.3 
Reception 4.9  Health 8.5  Cleaning                                         8.9 
ICDS construction 4.5  Miscellaneous 7.0  Electricity bill                                8.3
Office services 4.5  Bonasrijan 5.9  Stationary                                       7.8 
Other development 4.4 
 
Tubewell labor 4.4 
 Office 
entertainment                      
7.8 
Bonsarijan 4.0 
 
Reception 3.9 
 Telephone and 
Electric Repair       
4.4 
Printing  3.6 
 
Cash 3.8 
 Election 
contingency                      
3.9 
Office Parichalan 3.5  Daptar 3.7  Annual sports                                  3.9
        
Chauhatta  Daskalgram  Hatia 
Other Development 37.1 
 Contigency of general 
fund  
28.9 
 
Reception 37.1 
Office Parichalan 23.8 
 Tubewell Material & 
Parts  
20.9 
 
Office Parichalan 17.3 
Reception 17.5  Resource Person 15.4  Own Fund 15.5 
Homepathy Treatment 4.6 
 
Referessment 7.1 
 Land & House 
Tax (Return) 
6.3 
Telephone Bill 3.7 
 Tax collector 
Remuneration 
6.2 
 
Other Services 4.3 
Office Equipment 3.1  Advertizement 5.4  Health 3.1 
Electricity Bill 2.4  M F T A 3.9  Electricity Bill 3.1 
Other Services 2.0 
 
Court Case 3.7 
 Sports & Cultural 
Programme 
2.8 
Assasment Write 1.5  Travel Allowencess 2.1  Telephone Bill 2.8 
Commission to Tax 
Collector 
1.5 
 
Electricity Bill 2.0 
 Gram Samsad & 
Gram Sabha 
2.0 
        
Jhamtia  Kirnahar  Kurunnahar 
Nirmal Gram Puroskar 73.6  Own Fund (Ent.) 23.6  Office Parichalan 39.2 
Own Fund 7.2  Own Fund (Others) 15.4  Other Services 19.1 
Tubewell Material & 
Parts - Own 
3.4 
 
Owo Fund (Seresta) 14.3 
 Commission to 
Tax Collector 
11.5 
Office Parichalan 2.2  Sale Of Tree 9.0  Office Equipment 10.4 
Other Services 1.9 
 Jana Swastha, 
Education, Cultural 
6.7 
 
Reception 5.2 
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Table 7: Largest Own Fund Expenditures 2008-09 (continued) 
(percent of total Own Fund Expenditure) 
 
Jhamtia  Kirnahar  Kurunnahar 
Reception 1.8  Own Fund 6.4  Telephone Bill 4.4 
Tubewell Labour - 
Own Fund 
1.7 
 Commission to Tax 
Collector 
6.0 
 
Office Cleaning 3.5 
Office Equipment 1.0  Proflal 4.0  Electricity Bill 3.2 
Publicity & 
Advertisement 
0.9 
 
Office Cleaning 2.7 
 
Bank Charges 1.8 
Road Repairing 0.9 
 
T.A. Staff 2.6 
 Publicity & 
Advertisement 
1.2 
        
Padamati  Purandarpur  Sattor 
Miscellaneous 49.8 
 
Office Equipment 25.8 
 Tubewell Material 
& Parts - Own 
42.3 
Contingency 24.0 
 
Reception 16.0 
 Tubewell Labour 
- Own Fund 
11.4 
Commission to Tax 
Collector 
8.6 
 Sports & Cultural 
Programme 
10.7 
 
Reception 7.7 
Telephone Bill 7.5  Other Services 9.9  Medical bills 5.9 
Electricity Bill 5.9 
 
Health 9.5 
 Commission to 
Tax Collector 
3.1 
Election Expenses 1.5 
 Street Light 
Maintenance 
4.1 
 
Social Forestry 2.5 
Seminar 1.2 
 
Miscellaneous 3.8 
 Sports & Cultural 
Programme 
2.4 
Electrical Equipments 0.6 
 Gram Samsad & Gram 
Sabha 
3.4 
 
Health 2.3 
News Paper 0.5 
 
Others Development 3.4 
 Stationary 
materials 
2.1 
Other Services 0.3 
 
Office Parichalan 3.2 
 Advertisement 
expense 
2.0 
        
Totopara       
Commission to Toll 
Tax Collector 
18.5 
 
  
 
  
Road Repairing 15.6       
Reception 14.1       
Other Development 10.2       
Car hire 9.4       
Office Parichalan 8.5       
Contingency- Own 
Fund 
6.2 
 
 
 
 
  
Office Equipment 5.8       
Publicity & 
Advertisement 
3.0 
 
 
 
 
  
Commission to Tax 
Collector 
1.9 
 
 
 
 
  
        
 
Source:  GP CCERs, 2008-09, received July 2009, September 20009, and PRDD GPMS 
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the devolution that has been taken place, where the GP has found worthy projects along 
side scheme development activities and line ministry activities.   
 
There are other players in the expenditure system of the PRIs.  As noted in these report 
and elsewhere (GOWB 2007, Williamson 2008, and Polly 2007 among others), the line 
departments of state government are important players in terms of expenditures made at 
all levels of government.  In the sample GPs, officials made reference to large direct 
expenditures of the state on infrastructure projects, but no official had an estimate of the 
actual size of these projects.  Currently, there is no specific accounting for state line 
department expenditures at each level of PRI.  
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a role in expenditures in some of the 
GPs in West Bengal.  In Thalia, for example, we were told that there were five NGOs 
currently registered and two of those had activities in the GP.  The GP officials said that 
the NGOs had to apply to the GP to work in the area and received a certificate of 
completion when work was finished.  In some cases the NGOs were working on projects 
within the GPs plans and in these cases, the projects were coordinated by the GP at the 
GUS level.  According to the GP officials, in some cases the NGOs work on projects 
completely separate from the local government plans.  The GP officials did not have an 
estimate on the size of recent projects performed by NGOs.  In Bankra III there was one 
NGO currently active on a sanitation project.  Officials said that this NGO keeps the 
government informed of its activities but there is ―no requirement‖ for them to do so. 
 
In summary, the expenditures of the PRIs are varied by level but are largely driven by the 
grants and schemes of the central and state governments.  The main issues regarding 
expenditures are a lack of clarity in expenditure assignment, the relatively low level of 
expenditures in the PRI system and very low level of discretionary expenditures.  The 
next section analyses the current revenue streams of the PRIs and recent changes in 
revenue flows. 
 
 
 
Revenues 
 
While revenues of the PRI include own source revenues and untied grants, the revenue 
story is driven by schemes and grants financed through the Union and state budgets, just 
as expenditures.  Funds for the major grant programs may flow directly or indirectly 
through the State, PRDD, line departments, and PRIs.  Funds expended by line ministries 
are largely off-budget.  Because the central schemes and some of the state schemes are 
conditional, it is difficult to separate expenditure assignment and outcomes from grant 
inflows.  Annexure 4.1 of the PRDD Annual Report lists 38 funds for which releases 
were made to the PRI in 2007-08, including 24 scheme fund releases. 
 
The revenue system is dominated by transfers from the central government.  Table 8 
below provides a breakdown of major sources of revenue in 2002-03 and 2007-08.  The 
trend over this period has been an increase in the share of revenue from the central 
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government through increased Finance Commission grants, non-discretionary NOAPS 
funds, and imposition of new funds, namely the Backward Regions Grant Fund (which 
subsumed the RSVY program) (See Box 2 for more information on the new schemes).  
All revenues grew over period, but central government grants and schemes (released 
through the state and directly to the PRIs) increased more than 4.5 times between 2002-
03 and 2007-08, where state grants and schemes increased about 3-fold and own revenues 
nearly tripled over the period. The larger role of the central government came from untied 
grants (Finance Commission) and increases in central schemes.  Total revenue resources 
from all sources to the PRIs increased from 9.7 billion rupees in 2002-03 to 33 billion in 
2007-08, or approximately 514 rupees per capita.  With an annual average inflation rate 
of 4.8 percent in India over this time period, real revenues to the PRIs more than doubled 
over the period. 
 
Central and state grants and schemes are sent down to all three levels of PRIs directly 
from the central government or state, or directly to the PRIs.  As shown in Table 9, there 
has been a drift in the concentration of the devolution of central and state grants and 
schemes toward the GPs and away from the districts although the pattern is somewhat 
mixed over the last eight years.  Fiscal year 2006-07 is somewhat of an outlier due to a 
relatively large increase in 12
th
 Finance Commission grants to the GP between 2005-06 
and 2006-07.     
 
 
Table 8: The Composition of PRI Revenues 
(percent of total revenue, 2002-03 and 2007-08) 
 
Year Own Source Revenue State Grants  
and Schemes 
Central Government 
Grants and Schemes 
2002-03 4.7 44.3 50.9 
2007-08 3.4 34.4 62.2 
 
Source:  PRDD Annual Report (Table 4.7) 
 
 
Table 9: Distribution of Grants and Schemes through State among PRIs 
(percent of total state grants and schemes) 
 
PRI level 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
District 39.5 40.8 35.4 32.4 23.5 30.5 
Block 14.1 8.0 11.6 14.5 12.7 17.4 
GP 46.4 51.2 53.0 53.1 63.8 52.1 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source:  PRDD Annual Report (Table 4.6) 
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Of the transfers from the central and state governments, tied funds dominate untied funds.  
In 2007-08, the following was the distribution of revenues of total revenues for the PRIs 
(PRDD Annual Report Table 4.3): 
 
Salary Grants       7.5 
Schemes    73.6 
Untied Grants     15.5
25
 
Own revenue       3.4 
 
Williamson (2008) reports that the trend in revenues over the last six years has been 
continued dominance of the central and state schemes.  There have been three noteworthy 
changes to the fiscal landscape in the last three years.  The SGRY employment program 
was subsumed by NREGS, the central government established the Backward Regions 
Fund Grant, and the SRD program came on-line.  NREGS is non-discretionary while 
BRFG and the SRD program are more discretionary (with some specifications regarding 
types of expenditures allowed).  
 
The GPs own fund revenues are made up of tax and non-tax sources.  The major tax 
source is the land and housing tax (property tax) and non-tax sources include sales of 
natural resources, business fees, and tolls, among others.  In 2007-08, GP own source 
revenues per capita were less than 11 rupees.  The per capita own source revenue for all 
three tiers was 18.65 rupees.  Over the last five years, there has been some growth in own 
source revenue per capita at the district and GP level, with most of the growth occurring 
between 2005-06 and 2006-07.  Table 10 reports own source revenue per capita for all 
three tiers.  As seen there, the GPs generate the largest amount of OSR, and have doubled 
their resources since 2003-04.  The districts have also seen a large percentage increase in 
own source revenue.  However, the level of own source revenue is still very low.  In 
2007-08 PRDD reports total fund flows to the PRIs (salary, schematic, and other grants) 
of 3,230 crore rupees and total own source revenues of 112.84 crore rupees.  Own source 
revenue is approximately 3.5 percent of the state and central grant flows among all of the 
PRIs.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25  Allocating the BRFG to schemes.  If the BRFG is allocated to untied funds, the untied share increases to 
23.4 percent. 
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Box 2: Recent Changes in Grants and Schemes 
 
In the past two years there have been some significant changes to at least three 
programs:  the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 established the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, subsuming the SGRY program.  The 
program began in 2006 in 10 districts and was expanded in 2007 to seven more 
districts (Howrah was under the SGRY program through 2007). In addition, the 
Backward Region Fund Grant was authorized in 2006 and disbursements were made in 
West Bengal in 2007-08.  According to PRDD (Annual Report 2006-07), the purpose 
of the fund is two-fold:  
 
 Funding for development projects ―so as to bridge critical gaps in local 
infrastructure and other development requirements that are not being adequately 
met through existing inflows‖ (PRDD, p. 101) 
 
 Technical assistance to local bodies in planning, implementation and 
monitoring BRGF activities.  
 
The grant is listed by PRDD as a schematic fund, although the grant can be used for a 
variety of development projects.  In 2007-08, 266 crore rupees was released by PRDD 
for the BRFG.  The First Independent Review of the Backward Regions Grant Fund 
(World Bank 2009) provides the first detailed analysis of the BRGF, the planning 
process, dissemination, and uses of the funds in the GPs.  As noted in the Review, the 
two largest uses of the grant in West Bengal are for Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) centers (28%) and roads, including drainage and culverts (22%). 
 
The DFID program, Strengthening Rural Development (SRD) began in 2005, targeting 
six districts (backward districts).  The first distributions were made to 304 GPs. The 
output goals of the program are four-fold (PRDD Annual Report 2009 and Sambodhi 
Research and Communications, 2009): 
 
 Prepare and implement an effective roadmap for further decentralization 
 Develop the institutional framework and capacities for further decentralization 
 Increase pro-poor participatory planning, implementing, and monitoring 
 Improve resources used to strengthen livelihoods, improve service provision 
and reduce vulnerability of the poor (Sambodhi, p. 1) 
 
In 2008-09, ten districts received SRD fund support covering 465 GPs; 13.7 million 
rupees was sent to the GPs and 214.6 million to the GS.  The funds covered 4,462 GS 
with an average allocation of 50,200 rupees per GS.  The allocation to the GP level was 
on average 30,000 rupees per GP.   As noted elsewhere, the interim report on the SRD 
program suggests that it has been effective in achieving some goals, particularly in 
increasing resources to the GP and GS levels and encouraging participation among 
constituents. 
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Table 10: Own Source Revenue 
(per capita, rupees) 
 
 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
All levels per capita
a 
8.44 11.11 12.61 17.36 18.65 
Districts 1.63 2.38 2.22 4.85 5.94
b 
Blocks 1.34 2.19 2.63 2.05 2.58
b 
GPs 5.44 6.55 7.76 10.18 10.13
c 
 
 Sources: a PRDD Annual Report, Table 4.13, b PRDD Annual Report, Table 4.12, c PRDD Annual Report, 
Table 4.11;  other per capita amounts use the level of own source revenue provided by PRDD Annual 
Report Table 4.10 and use the implied population from Tables 4.11-4.13. 
 
 
Comparing the concentration of own source revenue to total revenue in 2005 and 2008, 
we find that only in Thalia was there an increase in the percent of own source revenue to 
total revenue.
26
  Using the same data, we find that tax revenues grew faster than non-tax 
revenues only in Malangighi. 
 
In the field visits, officials expressed general consensus of increases in own source 
revenue over the last three years and these are borne out in the data.  However, the source 
of increase varied by GP.  For example, in one GP (Malangighi) an increase in revenue 
was attributed to more aggressive collection of property tax arrears.  Officials from 
Malangighi estimated that their collection rate was 95 percent of assessed property taxes.    
In Thalia and Shyamsundar, the collection rate for property tax (taxes collected divided 
by assessed taxes) was 60-70 percent and 47 percent respectively, suggesting room for 
improved property tax collections and further increase in own source revenue.  
Interestingly, officials in both GPs seemed to blame the administration for lax collection 
activities as much as a lack of voluntary compliance by taxpayers.  In Bankra, the GP 
officials said that voluntary citizen contributions were on the rise, and names of the 
contributors were published in a document that circulated in the GP but the growth of 
property tax was not singled out as a source of increased own source revenue in Bankra. 
 
Using data from the CCER, we report the main sources of own source revenue for the 
sample GPs for which we have CCER data in Table 11.  There is substantial diversity of 
sources of own revenues among these GPs.  For example, Shyamsundar and Purandarpur 
GPs receive most of their own fund revenue from sales from trees and fees associated 
with use of ponds.  In interviews with officials in Shyamsundar, they stated that this is a 
recent trend for them.  They also expressed interest in the need for being more aggressive 
about property tax collections.  Thalia and Jhamtia received large rewards for 
mobilization (in the case of Jhamtia, it was attributed to works from the Nirmal Gram 
Purosakar).  Maszidpur, Furunnahar, Padamati, Sattor, and Jamuar GPs receive the 
largest share of own revenue from property tax and fees.  GPs that were interviewed did 
                                               
26  For 2005, we use data from the GOWB 2007 study and for 2008 we use data from the CCER.  Absolute 
levels of own source revenue increased in all GPs. 
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not remark that there were any significant changes in their own revenue structure over the 
past three years.     
 
In summary, the revenue picture for the GPs shows marked growth in all sources over the 
last eight years.  However, the largest revenue growth at this level is in grants and 
schemes, with the relative level of growth of own source funds lagging.  Property taxes, 
fees, and sales of natural resources have increased own source revenues the most in the 
sample GPs.  Still, the level of own source revenue is low—on average about 11 rupees 
per capita.  If we add untied funds and classify the BRFG as an untied source, then 
Williamson (2008) reports that by 2008-09, the level of per capita discretionary funds is 
68 rupees.  This is a substantial increase in level from 2003-04 when the per capita 
amount of discretionary revenue was 11 rupees per person. 
 
In the next section, we turn to an analysis of the abilities of GPs to absorb new funds, 
which is an important consideration for the expansion of GP resources. 
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Table 11: Own Source Revenue Sample GPs 
(percent of total own fund revenue minus adjustments) 
 
GP 
Land and 
house tax 
Trade fees 
and 
registrations 
Toll fees^ Miscellaneous 
Sale of 
trees 
Pond 
leasing 
Scrap sale Donations 
Reward for 
mobilization 
THALIA 16 6.1 Less than 1 Not reported Not reported Not reported Not reported 13.1 50.4 
SHYAMSUNDAR 12.4 Less than 1 Less than 1 Not reported 46.7 14.5 6.7 Not reported Not reported 
MASZIDPUR 58.8 1.7 19.6 7.5 Not reported Not reported Not reported Not reported Not reported 
BANKRA III          
MALANDIGHI          
CHAUHATTA 9 4.8 8.4 0 0 2.3 7.5 0 Not reported 
DASKALGRAM** 0 0 0 0 0 Not reported 0 0 Not reported 
DOMOHANI 21.9 2.6 0 3.3 0 Not reported Less than 1 0 Not reported 
HATIA 24.1 1 0 18.1 0 Not reported 0 0 Not reported 
JHAMTIA Less than 1 Less than 1 0 Less than 1 4 Not reported 0 0 76.5* 
KHARIA 18.8 7.7 0 1.1 0 Not reported 0 0 Not reported 
KIRNAHAR 33.3 Less than 1 0 0 10.6 0 4 0 Not reported 
KURUNNAHAR 72.1 1.5 0 0 0 Not reported 0 0 Not reported 
MAJDIA 9.3 4.4 0 Less than 1 0 Not reported 0 10.3 Not reported 
PADAMATI 36.1 0 0 Less than 1 2.5 0 0 41.9 Not reported 
PURANDARPUR 16.8 0 0 0 32.6 Not reported 0 0 Not reported 
SARPALEHANA Not reported 0 0 0 0 Less than 1 0 Less than 1 Not reported 
SATTOR 35.5 2.1 0 Less than 1 0 Not reported 0 0 Not reported 
TOTOPARA 4.8 Less than 1 31.3 0 0 Not reported 0 11 Not reported 
JASOHARI          
JAMUAR 35.1 1.7 Less than 1 1.8 2.2 1.1 Not reported 33.1 Not reported 
 
Source:  CCER of GPs, received July 2009 and September 2009, and PRDD GPMS 
 
Notes: * Nirmal Gram Puroskar 
^ Road tolls and Toll tax (in Totopara)  
**Tax Collection 18.8%
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GPs Ability to Absorb Additional Funds 
 
A long standing issue in GP finance in West Bengal has been issue of the ability of the 
GPs to actually use the current level of tied and untied grants and the potential to absorb 
an increase in untied funds.  Analysis of closing balances as a share of receipts (GOWB 
(2007) and Williamson (2008)) has been used to evaluate the absorption capacity of the 
GPs.
27
  Based on those analyses, the average absorption capacity of GPs in West Bengal 
has not changed over the last five years and closing balances remain between 22 and 28 
percent of receipts.  Among the four GPs for which we have detailed data, the average 
closing balances as a share of available funds (receipts plus opening balances) is 17.6—
somewhat below the average across West Bengal.   
 
We are able to compare the closing balances as a share of revenue received (net of 
opening balances) for a number of GPs from 2005 (using the detailed data from GOWB 
2007) to those reported in 2008-09.  The changes in this measure of absorption are 
mixed—two non-BRGF GPs show no significant difference in the ratio, one shows a 
large improvement of absorption of these funds, and one GP shows deterioration in 
absorption of funds.  Three SRD/BRFG GPs show an increase in closing balances as a 
share of revenue received (we did not have complete data to evaluate the other 11 
SRD/BRFG GPs in our sample).  While the sample is small, there is limited evidence that 
among non-BRFG GPs there is no strong evidence of more or less absorption of revenue 
in a fiscal year between 2004-05 and 2008-09 while in the case of three SRD/BRFG GPs 
there is some evidence of larger closing balances as a share of revenue received.  A full 
accounting of these balances using all GPs in the GPMS would be helpful to better 
understanding the closing balances phenomenon.  
 
The CCER includes a utilization calculation based on GP receipts and expenditures.  The 
Utilization Ratio is the ratio of actual payments divided by available funds—another way 
to measure absorption.  As noted earlier, actual payments are total reported expenditures 
minus adjustments; available funds are actual receipts (reported receipts minus 
adjustments) plus opening balances. The simple average utilization ratio for non-
SRD/BRFG GPs is 84.5 percent and the utilization rate for the 15 sample SRD/BRFG is 
70.5 (the utilization ratio for the GPs is reported in Table 12).   
 
The PRDD Annual Report and the GP CCERs provide information on expenditures as a 
share of releases by major ledger head (including tied and untied funds).  Table 13 is 
reproduced from Williamson (2008), and the data demonstrate the differences in 
absorption among the GPs in West Bengal by major category.  The lowest utilization rate 
for any fund is found for IAY, where 78 percent of releases were expended in 2007-08.  
Overall, the utilization rate is relatively high among the GPs in West Bengal in 2007-08. 
 
                                               
27  Measuring absorption capacity as the ratio of closing balances to receipts is one measure of absorption 
capacity.  As noted below, there may be good reasons for this ratio to be high including the timing of 
disbursements of funds to the PRIs.  PRIs that are conservative in their fiscal planning may also keep a 
portion of receipts as a type of ―rainy-day‖ fund for unexpected needs.  
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Among the five of the sample GPs, payments as a share of receipts for tied funds varies 
from 70 to 95 percent and for untied funds, from 97.5 to 99.8 percent.  The tied funds 
with the lowest usage rate are NREGS in three of the GPs and NOAPS in two GPs 
(reported in Table 14). 
 
While the absorption and usage rates call into question the GPs capacities to utilize funds, 
it is often mentioned that the timing of the disbursements of various funds from the state 
to the GPs is problematic and may help aggravate the absorption and usage rates.  GOWB 
(2007), Datta (2007), and others report that large unspent balances at the year‘s end result 
from the timing of state disbursements.  In the field visits undertaken for this report, two 
GPs noted that they continue to have this timing trouble and also noted that they do not 
have information about expected state flows to their budgets in a timely manner.  These 
views were expressed in the GPs with the most seasoned officials.  This is different from 
impressions reached three years ago in multiple interviews with GPs where timing of the 
state disbursement of funds was universally mentioned as an issue for GPs.
28
  The state 
has taken steps to improve the flow of funds since 2005 by instituting changes in the 
banking and fund transfer systems discussed above. 
 
 
Table 12:  Utilization Ratio for Sample GPs (2008-09) 
 
          GP Utilization Ratio 
Thalia 79.34 
Shyamsundar 93.78 
Maszidpur 80.53 
Majdi 44.84 
Sattor 56.34 
Haita 65.01 
Jhamtia 65.24 
Jhamtia Amta-II 65.24 
Batikar 68.45 
Purandarpur 69.54 
Kurunnahar 69.85 
Kharia-Jalpaiguri 72.80 
Padamati-I 74.73 
Sarpalenhana-Albandha 75.22 
Totopara-Ballalguri 79.32 
Doskalgram 79.82 
Kirnahar II 85.13 
Chauhatta-Muhodari 86.44 
                                 
                                  Source:  GP CCERs received July, 2009, September 2009, and PRDD GPMS 
                                               
28  For some schemes, the GPs must present utilization certificates certifying the status of various schemes.  
For some schemes, additional releases at the district level are made when the average utilization within the 
district meets some specified minimum.  This in a sense punishes the GPs that utilize funds in a timely 
fashion and may reduce the incentive to do so.  
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Table 13:  Average Releases and Expenditures for all GPs  
(rupees, 2007-08) 
 
  2007/08  
 Release Expenditure Expenditure / 
Releases (%) 
    
Salary and Allowances Grants    
GP Salary 549,396 572,684 104% 
Allowance to Tax Collectors 3,280 2,783 85% 
GP TADA 49,195 40,103 82% 
Sub Total 601,871 615,569 102% 
    
Schematic Funds - -  
IAY (Housing) 1,026,373 804,502 78% 
SRGY (Rural Employment) 27,105 101,632 375% 
NREGS (Rural Employment) 2,721,105 2,597,454 95% 
Construction of Phachayat Ghars 373 373 100% 
CHCMI (Communith Healthcare)  283 283 100% 
NOAPS (Pension) 855,962 824,456 96% 
Sub Total 4,631,200 4,328,699 93% 
    
Untied Grants - -  
Incentive Grants 8,259 8,259 100% 
Second State Finance Commission 366,445 386,526 105% 
Twelfth Finance Commission (Centre) 443,326 435,287 98% 
BRGF (Backwards Regions 
Development) 
252,914 n/a n/a 
Professions and Callings 427 427 100% 
Entertainment Tax 22,171 22,171 100% 
Sub Total 1,093,542 852,669 101% 
    
GRAND TOTAL 6,326,613 5,796,937 95% 
 
Source:  Williamson (2008), p. 11. 
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Table 14:  Expenditures as a percent of revenues received for five GPs (2008-09) 
 
 Thalia Shyamsundar Maszidpur Bankra III Malandighi 
Tied Funds 80.0 96.7 92.3 71.0 95.4 
Exhibit: fund 
with lowest 
expenditures as a 
share of 
revenues  
NREGS 
41% 
NOAPS 
11.8% 
NREGS 
6.8% 
NREGS 
45% 
NOAPS 
19.9% 
Untied Funds 99.8 99.8 98.9 97.5 98.2 
 
Source:  Budget and report forms of GPs, 2008-09. 
 
  
One way to clarify the timing of funds issue is to look at Form 26.  This is a monthly 
statement of fund position, for which we have complete data for three GPs for one to 
three months.  Without multiple months of these reports, it is difficult to say much about 
the actual flow of fund receipts, but we do see some interesting timing issues in these 
cases.  For example, in the case of IAY, in June 2009, in Shyamsundar, funds received 
from IAY were virtually the only IAY funds available by June 30, 2009, while in 
Maszidpur, IAY funds received during the month of June were about 50 percent of funds 
made available previous to June 2009.  In Bankra III funds made available in June 
doubled total funds available.  The funds available for IAY by June 30, 2009 represent 
the follow share of total funds expended for IAY in fiscal year 2008-09:  87 percent for 
Shyamsundar, 110 percent for Maszidpur, and 29 percent for Bankra III.   
 
In the case of NREGS, in June 2009, in Shyamsundar funds received for NREGS were 
(again) the only funds available by June 30, 2009, while in Maszidpur and Bankra III, no 
NREGS funds were made available in the month of June, 2009.  The funds available for 
NREGS by June 30, 2009 represent the follow share of total funds expended for NREGS 
in fiscal year 2008-09:  15 percent for Shyamsundar, 5 percent for Maszidpur, and over 
200 percent for Bankra III. 
 
It is not possible to determine if this pattern is similar in previous years, but it does 
suggest that timing of the release of funds is not smooth, and may affect the ability of 
GPs to plan for and execute various schemes.  
 
Do GPs need additional untied funds?  The easy answer is yes, but it is difficult to define 
―how much‖ and that issue is taken up in the next section.  In the field visits to GPs, each 
GP was able to articulate needs for additional untied funds.  The needs expressed were 
for the following expenditures: 
 
 Water (clean water, reduce standing water, drainage, connections to dwellings 
and wells)  
 Sanitation 
 Social forestry 
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 Crisis and natural disaster aid 
 Building additional institutions of alternative primary (SSK) and secondary 
(MSK) education 
 Books and furniture for schools 
 Bettering ICDS buildings and services 
 
When asked about ability to find labor and materials and direct projects, three of the GPs 
said there would be no difficulty in carrying out the additional projects.  In two GPs, we 
did not get an answer to the question.  A general impression is that the GPs in this small 
sample have thought about priorities and are prepared to carry out important public 
projects in their GPs if money is made available. This impression holds for non-
SRD/BRFG GPs as well as SRD/BRFG GPs. 
 
The first assessment of the SRD program raises some important issues related to the 
expansion of untied grants (Sambodhi Research and Communications, 2009).  The report 
correctly notes that it is very early to assess gains in service delivery and poverty 
reduction associated with the SRD program.  The focus of the assessment is on 
measurable outcomes including poverty reduction and income generation.  The focus of 
the assessment is not on the change in the composition of expenditures.  The report 
suggests that there is some evidence of increased incomes among households in SRD 
GPs relative to those in a non-SRD control group.  What is difficult to discern from the 
report is specifically how this additional income generation may have occurred.  The 
analysis finds evidence that in the SRD GPs, households have larger increases in 
financial and social capital relative to the control GPs (non-SRD GPs).   
 
The SRD program has focused in part on expanding the network and reach of Self-Help 
Groups (SHGs) and the authors of the assessment report credit the increase in financial 
capital of the poor to improved access to financial services via the SHGs.  There is no 
obvious way to document this empirically.  Social capital is measured by attendance at 
GP and GUS meetings and presence of SHGs in the GPs.  The more tangible measures of 
improved economic conditions—physical, human, and natural (livestock and other) 
capital—are not found to differ significantly between SRD and non-SRD GPs.  It may 
simply be too early for the impacts to reach to this level.  The next assessment is 
scheduled for 2011.  It may be worthwhile to the new grant development to carry out that 
assessment earlier.  The same sample could be analyzed, which could reduce time and 
monetary costs of doing an interim assessment in 2010.  A focus of that assessment might 
be the change in the composition of expenditures as a measure of the ―success‖ of the 
untied grant funds in promoting local fiscal decisions. 
 
The assessment raises the point a number of times that the GPs‘ mandate does not cover 
policy decisions over many important services including health and education.  But the 
report points out that increases in the quality of service delivery for these important 
services could be enhanced by more active GP participation in terms of public awareness 
education, engaging with the line ministries in tailoring education and health programs, 
encouraging local participation in budgeting and planning, etc.  Given the relatively 
limited room GPs have in the scope of education and health expenditures, we might not 
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expect to see substantial gains in poverty indicators.  It may therefore be difficult to pick 
up quantitative measures of success in aggregates like the level of poverty.  As grant 
development moves forward, a condition of the new grant program might be for the 
individual GPs themselves to define measures of success going into the grant program.   
 
Next, we turn to an analysis of the need for additional revenue and possible impacts of 
additional untied revenue on GP finances.   
 
 
 
Additional Expenditure Needs 
 
The GOWB Roadmap for Panchayats (2009) envisions three roles for the PRIs in West 
Bengal (Roadmap, page 14):   
 
 Performance of obligatory duties in line with Article 243G of the Constitution—
related to socio-economic development and covering governance and 
administration; 
 
 Tasks done on behalf of the state as an agent of Government (including schemes 
for social welfare); and 
 
 Own activities of the PRIs taken up in pursuit of economic development and 
justice, often concurrent with the state.   
 
These roles are largely an affirmation of an on-going process of decentralization to the 
PRIs in West Bengal.  The Roadmap provides detail regarding the support and 
development of PRIs in support of these roles and discusses areas in need of expanded 
service delivery, needs for resources (institutional, technical, and financial), and a 
detailed strategy for achieving growth in the roles of the PRIs.  Many of the specific 
implementation strategies call for improved service delivery, which will most certainly 
require additional revenues.  The Roadmap strategy implementation specifically mention 
increased mobilization of own revenue revenues.  An additional component could be 
expanded support from the state, and the current DFID-World Bank coordinated SRD 
grant is a reasonable mechanism to consider expanding to serve these needs. 
 
For the new grant program, the GOWB, DFID, and the World Bank focus on a ―better 
functioning GP system in the state‖ and ―improved institutional performance by targeted 
GPs‖ as goals for the program.  The interim assessment report and Roadmap also speak 
to improved service delivery—hopefully a complementary outcome.  It is important to 
acknowledge that a focus on the GP level is one of several possibly strategies for 
improving service delivery.  The GOWB (2007) report on the fiscal condition of the PRIs 
in West Bengal provides a discussion of the role of the PRIs in expenditure delivery and 
the issue of expanded expenditure responsibility of the PRI.  The 2007 report provides 
arguments related to the appropriate level of expenditure responsibility and management 
among the PRIs.  Economic efficiency might be enhanced by increased responsibility at 
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the GP level, but the report points out that economies of scale, spillovers in benefit areas, 
capacity, and the sheer number of GPs may reduce the feasibility of a substantially 
increased role of GPs in service delivery.   
 
As noted earlier, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to the PRIs is more a 
devolution of responsibilities than assignment for authority over functions.  The strategy 
for further devolution (and some clarification) is repeated in the Roadmap which calls for 
amendments to the West Bengal Panchayat Act on expenditure assignments.
29
  However, 
it is quite clearly stated that some assignments will be concurrent with the state (page 13) 
and over time, these may be devolved further as GPs gain experience in the provision of 
public goods.   
 
How much additional resource should be considered for the new grant?  This is difficult o 
answer when expenditure assignment is still unresolved.  As discussed in GOWB (2007) 
best practice would have the GOWB establish new expenditure assignments and 
estimating minimum expenditures to determine the amount of additional revenue to share 
with the GPs.  Ultimately, we night consider the expenditure need of the PRIs, 
particularly at the GP level.  Accurately estimating expenditure need is a notoriously 
difficult exercise and beyond the scope of this report.  Instead, we will present analyses 
of alternative expansions in revenue for the GPs.   
 
Example 1:  The Second State Finance Committee recommended a devolution of 16 
percent of state taxes to urban and rural bodies and the Third SFC suggests a more 
modest 5 percent.  As noted earlier, this devolution has not occurred and it was never 
supported by a specific expenditure objective.  As a starting point, we can analyze a16 
percent devolution as the new grant basis.  The PRI share of the pool would be 11 percent 
(of the 16 percent), and of that, GPs would receive 32 percent based on the current 
distribution of expenditures among the three tiers (GOWB 2007).  With 2009 revenue 
receipts of 360 billion rupees at the state level, this devolution would suggest an increase 
of 3.5 million rupees on average per GP—or 195 rupees per person at the GP level.  
Based on Williamson‘s estimates of discretionary untied revenues, this would increase 
discretionary revenues by more than 4 times at the GP level.  The cost to government for 
a pilot of 800 GPs would be an increase of 0.8 percent of state government revenue 
receipts (focusing on just the GP level).   
 
An increase of this magnitude might be difficult for the GPs to absorb.  For example, in 
Malangihi GP, we were told their main priority for new funds would be to increase water 
supply.  Officials in the GP estimated the cost of the expansion to be approximately 3 
million rupees over 18 years.  A transfer of 3.5 million rupees in a new grant suggests 
that the water supply issue most important to them could be dealt with over a relatively 
short period of time.  In Shyamsundar need was expressed for 6 million rupees for 
expanded ICDS facilities and services. Again, a grant of the magnitude of 3.5 million 
would meet that expenditure requirement in only 2 years.  In Thalia, the need expressed 
was to expand primary and secondary schools at a cost of 300,000-400,000 rupees (per 
                                               
29  Specific examples of devolved services are drinking water, maintenance of vital statistics, monitoring 
some aspects of public health, literacy and sports and culture, and actual building of metal roads. 
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school with ―some‖ needed).  Finally, in Bankra III officials said they could easily absorb 
100 rupees per person more for health and sanitation.  Other officials in the room said 
even more funds were needed because educational facilities needed to be upgraded and 
expanded. 
 
These case studies do not provide hard evidence of the specific expenditure needs of the 
GPs in West Bengal, but they suggest that there is some scope for absorbing substantially 
increased funds.  Of the sample GPs, Bankra III discussed expenditure needs closer to the 
magnitude of the transfer of this first example. 
 
Example 2:  GOWB (2007) provides an analysis of a new (or expanded grant) that would 
double or triple current the level of per capita expenditures as examples of how the grant 
system could be expanded. The simulations provide a distribution based on either a 
minimum expenditures (ensuring a basic level of expenditures equal to 2 or 3 times the 
average per capita expenditure in 2005) or a formula basis (incorporating a degree of 
equalization in the system). 
 
These alternatives would provide substantial increased revenue to the GPs for 
discretionary expenditures.  If the doubling and tripling of per capita GP expenditures 
were done at 2009 levels, this would represents an increase in the share of state revenue 
receipts to 5 percent and 11 percent respectively to cover all GPs or 1.4 and 2.9 percent 
for 800 GPs. As the GOWB analysis demonstrates, there are alternatives to financing 
including increased revenue mobilization from enhanced revenue autonomy (specifically 
for the property tax), redirection of the share of state revenues going to urban 
governments, or increased taxes at the state level, for example. 
 
Example 3: Williamson (2008) presents an analysis to add $1 or $2 per capita to GP 
discretionary expenditures.  Williamson analyzed a baseline of 68 rupees per capita of 
untied GP funds on average (44 rupees per capita completely discretionary for 
investment).  Under this assumption, an increase of $1 per capita would more than double 
the amount available to GPs to 114 rupees per capita (and 90 rupees per capita on average 
for investment) across GPs.  An increase of $2 per person would further increase per 
capita discretionary revenue to 160 rupees per person on average (136 rupees per person 
for investment on average) (Williamson Table 6). 
 
The $1 per capita revenue increase is of the magnitude that Thalia and Shyamsundar GPs 
suggested they needed to address current needs that they cannot address with their current 
level of revenues.  
 
These significantly expanded revenues represent a relatively small increase in state 
transfers while increasing discretionary revenues by 136 to 209 percent.  The cost to the 
state is estimated by Williamson at $15 million for 800 GPs for the $1 per capita increase 
and $64 million for all GPs.  For the $2 per capita expenditure, the cost is estimated at 
$30 million for 800 GPs and $128 million for all GPs.  For 800 GPs at current exchange 
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rates, this is approximately 0.4 to 0.8 percent of the states expected 2009 revenue 
receipts.
30
 
 
Example 4:   If own fund revenue per capita were doubled, this would represent an 
increase in revenue on average of 11 rupees per person in the GPs.  Adding this to the 
discretionary revenue of 68 rupees per person, this represents an increase of 16 percent in 
average own fund revenues per capita, or twenty five percent of discretionary revenues 
for investment.  This is a relatively small amount—about 167 million rupees for 800 GPs 
(about 700 million for all GPs)—roughly $3.6 million ($15 million).  Doubling own fund 
revenues could be a revenue mobilization component of the new grant.   
 
Alternatively, we might focus on a different definition of the ―discretionary base for 
investment‖ of GPs and compare $1 and $2 per capita increases in the level of 
discretionary revenue.  Such an analysis is somewhat subjective since some schemes and 
grants are more discretionary than others.  In Tables 15, 16, and 17, we provide such an 
analysis using data from the GPMS and field visits and applying defensible assumptions 
regarding use of the grants (based on interviews and limited data).  The data are presented 
per GP, with per capita figures in italics.  Data in Table 18 summarizes these results in 
the context of a simulation exercise where we consider new $1 and $2 per capita 
discretionary grants flowing to the GPs.  The GPs used in this analysis constitute a 
relatively small sample, but it provides a more detailed analysis of the potential size of 
the new grant relative to a more detailed definition of discretionary revenues currently 
available for investment at the GP level.  In each table, the last column is an estimate of 
the current available revenue available for new investment expenditures by the GP.  
These might be thought of as the ―true‖ discretionary investment revenues that GPs 
currently have at their disposal.  In Tables 15-17, the exhibit demonstrates the relative 
size of a $1 or $2 per capita grant for the average of all GPs. 
 
In Table 15, all NREGS, NOAPS, IAY, salary, 12
th
 FC, BRFG, SRD and other grants are 
considered unavailable for new investment.  This table is therefore the most conservative 
estimate of current revenues available for new investment.  Based on this analysis, the 
average discretionary revenue available for investment across for all GPs is 34 rupees per 
capita and for SRD and/or BRFG GPs is 53 dollars per capita.  A new grant of $1 per 
capita or $2 per capita would more than double or triple the available investment 
revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
30  Assuming an increase in expenditures of 7 percent from 2007-08 to 2008-09. 
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Table 15:  Breakdown of GP Revenues, per GP (rupees) 
(per capita)  
 
    
GP Group 
(1)  
Total 
Revenue 
(2) 
 Non-
Discretionary/heavily 
conditional: 
NREGS 
NOAPS 
IAY 
Other 
(3) 
Salary 
(4) 
Discretionary/some 
conditionality 
12
th
 FC 
BRFG 
SRD 
other 
(5) 
Residual 
Available 
for new 
investment 
      
All GPs 7,290,850 
(382) 
5,106,251 
(268) 
601,871 
(32) 
942,394 
(49) 
640,333 
(34) 
      
Non 
SRD/BRFG (4 
GPs) 
9,358,452 
(521) 
6,942,024 
(378) 
937,073 
(52) 
447,405 
(27) 
1,031,950 
(65) 
      
SRD and/or 
BRFG (11 
GPs) 
11,069,025 
(675) 
7,565,868 
(452) 
928,429 
(57) 
1,739,592 
(113) 
835,576 
(53) 
      
EXHIBIT: 
$1 per capita 
(46 rupees) 
    
877,758 
(46) 
      
$2 per capita 
(92 rupees) 
    
1,755,516 
(92) 
      
 
Notes:  All GP analysis for 2007-08;  SRD/BFRG/Non-SRD/BRFG GP analysis for 2008-09. 
Total revenue includes all funds in the account over a fiscal year including opening balances, direct fund 
deposits, adjustments and transfers. Distinctions are based on observable practices in use of grant funds 
 
 
Realistically, some of the revenues from various schemes allow some room for 
discretionary expenditures.  There is no hard and fast rule about the percent of those 
scheme revenues that are actually discretionary on the part of the GPs, but we make what 
we think are reasonable assumptions based on discussions with GPs and PRDD.  In Table 
16, we classify most of the major grants and schemes into discretionary welfare/non-
discretionary/heavily conditional (column labeled 2), discretionary non-welfare/some 
conditionality (column labeled 4) and residual available for investment (column labeled 
5).  The assumption here is while some scheme funds may allow the GPs some room 
regarding their usage; they are still largely used for welfare or other non-investment 
purposes.  Based on this analysis, on average, across all GPs, this does not affect the 
estimate of residual funds available for new investment (last column), but suggests that 
there are more revenues associated with ―discretionary non-welfare‖ expenditures that 
have some level of conditionality.  These expenditures might include basic operations 
and maintenance of facilities but do not include new investments.  
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Table 16:  Breakdown of GP Revenues, per GP (rupees) 
(per capita)  
 
GP Group 
(1) 
Total 
Revenue 
(2) 
Discretionary 
“Welfare”/ Non-
Discretionary/heavily 
conditional: 
NREGS (30%) 
NOAPS (100%) 
IAY (100%) 
SRD (90%) 
BRFG (10%) 
Other 
(3) 
Salary 
(4) 
Discretionary non-
welfare/some 
conditionality 
12
th
 FC 
BRFG (90%) 
NREGS (70%) 
SRD (10%) 
other 
(5) 
Residual 
Available 
for new 
investment 
      
All GPs 
7,290,850 
(382) 
3,068,870 
(161) 
601,871 
(32) 
2,979,776 
(156) 
640,333 
(34) 
      
Non 
SRD/BRFG (4 
GPs) 
9,358,452 
(521) 
3,996,473 
(230) 
937,073 
(52) 
3,392,956 
(174) 
1,031,950 
(65) 
      
SRD and/or  
BRFG (11 
GPs) 
11,069,205 
(675) 
4,888,028 
(293) 
928,429 
(57) 
4,417,596 
(272) 
835,153 
(53) 
      
EXHIBIT: 
$1 per capita 
(46 rupees) 
    
 
877,758 
(46) 
      
$2 per capita 
(92 rupees) 
    
1,755,516 
(92) 
      
 
Notes:  All GP analysis for 2007-08;  SRD/BFRG/Non-SRD/BRFG GP analysis for 2008-09 
Total revenue includes all funds in the account over a fiscal year including opening balances, direct fund 
deposits, adjustments and transfers. Distinctions are based on observable practices in use of grant funds 
 
 
In the last of these tables, Table 17, we allocate a large share of BRFG and NREGS to 
new investment.  This least conservative assumption (most ―liberal‖ assumption) 
regarding the level of discretionary funds available for investment suggests that, under a 
liberal interpretation of discretion, overall, GPs have 166 rupees per capita to spend on 
new investments, and SRD/BRFG GPs have substantially more—259 rupees per capita.  
A $1 per capita or $2 per capita non-discretionary grant would still represent a significant 
increase in discretionary revenue to GPs of between 18 and 36 percent increase for SRD 
and/or BRFG GPs and for all GPs between 28 and 56 percent increase in investment 
funds. 
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Table 17: Breakdown of GP Revenues, per GP (rupees) 
(per capita)  
 
GP Group 
(1) Total 
Revenue 
(2) Discretionary 
“Welfare”/ Non-
Discretionary/heavily 
conditional: 
NREGS (30%) 
NOAPS (100%) 
IAY (100%) 
SRD (90%) 
BFRG (10%) 
Other 
(3) 
Salary 
(4) Discretionary 
non-welfare/some 
conditionality 
12
th
 FC 
SRD (10%) 
other 
(5) 
Residual 
Available 
for new 
investment 
plus 
BRFG 
(90%) 
NREGS 
(70%) 
      
All GPs 
7,290,850 
(382) 
3,068,870 
(161) 
601,871 
(32) 
462,238 
(24) 
3,157,871 
(166) 
      
Non 
SRD/BRFG (4 
GPs) 
9,358,452 
(521) 
3,996,473 
(230) 
937,073 
(52) 
447,405 
(27) 
3,977,501 
(213) 
      
SRD and/or  
BRFG (11 
GPs) 
11,069,205 
(675) 
4,888,028 
(293) 
928,429 
(57) 
1,015,260 
(66) 
4,237,489 
(259) 
      
EXHIBIT: 
$1 per capita 
(46 rupees) 
    
 
877,758 
(46) 
      
$2 per capita 
(92 rupees) 
    
1,755,516 
(92) 
      
 
Notes:  All GP analysis for 2007-08;  SRD/BFRG/Non-SRD/BRFG GP analysis for 2008-09 
Total revenue includes all funds in the account over a fiscal year including opening balances, direct fund 
deposits, adjustments and transfers. Distinctions are based on observable practices in use of grant funds 
 
 
These analyses of expanded untied revenues to the GPs demonstrate different orders of 
magnitude in GP discretion.  Again, we emphasize that without a focus on expenditure 
assignment, it is difficult to recommend any one of these examples or dozens of others.  
Even a quadrupling of current per capita expenditures of GPs (Example 1) is within the 
scope of perceived need of at least one of the sample GPs.   
 
Based on conversations in the PRDD/WB/DFID working group, the most likely scenario 
for the new grant is one that increases per capita discretionary revenues for GPs by $1 or 
$2 per capita.  The effects of the sized grant are substantial and important to the GPs.   
The data in Table 18 present an analysis of the magnitude of such a grant on GPs in the 
sample analyzed in this report.  The simulations report the average, minimum and 
maximum per capita discretionary grants under current law using conservative 
assumptions regarding the calculation of revenues for new investment (row labeled 1) 
and under liberal assumptions (row labeled 2).  For the ―All GPs‖ group, the mean level 
of per capita revenue available for investment under conservative assumptions is 34 
rupees per capita and under more liberal definitions it is 166 rupees per capita (based on 
summary data from PRDD).  Since we do not have micro data available for comparison, 
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we report the minimum and maximums among the sample GPs.  Under the conservative 
assumption, among the non-SRD/BRFG GPs, Bankra III has the lowest per capita 
revenue available for investment (32 rupees per capita) and Maszidpur has the largest 
(101).  Under the more liberal assumptions, Bankra III still has the lowest level of per 
capita potential investment revenue (54.6 rupees) while Malangighi has the largest 
(457.5). 
 
Among the SRD and/or BRFG GPs, Sammatinagar has the smallest level of per capita 
investment grant potential in the conservative case (10.1 rupees per capita) and Jhamtia 
has the largest (136.1).  Under the liberal definition of investment revenues, 
Sammatinagar retains the lowest level (65.6) and Totopara has the largest level of per 
capita investment revenue (477.8).  It is obvious that even in this relatively small sample, 
with somewhat noisy data, the disparities among GPs in terms of investment potential 
revenue are very large.   
 
Lines 4 and 5 of Table 18 demonstrate the relative magnitude of an increase in 
discretionary investment revenues of $1 per capita.  The level change in all cases is 46 
rupees per person.  Among all GPs, such a grant would yield an increase in per capita 
discretionary expenditures of 135 percent in the conservative case and 28 percent in the 
liberal case.  At the extremes, Bankra III would see an increase of 144 percent and 
Maszidpur would witness an increase of 45.5 percent (conservative min and max), and 
Bankra III and Malangighi would see increases of 84 and 10 percent respectively in the 
liberal case.  In the case of the SRD and/or BRFG GPs, the average GP would see 
increases of 87 and 18 percent in the conservative and liberal cases respectively.  At the 
extremes, Sammatinagar would see an increase of 460 percent in the conservative case 
and 70 percent under the liberal definition of discretionary investment revenues.  Jhamtia 
would see an increase of 34 percent (conservative maximum) and Totopara would see an 
increase of 9.6 percent under the liberal definition. 
 
In the case of a $2 per capita grant, the additional revenues are 92 rupees per capita. The 
order of magnitude change from a $2 per capita grant can be seen in the lower bank of 
Table 18. 
 
This simulation exercise demonstrates that a $1 or $2 grant per capita would have a large 
and significant impact on GPs discretionary expenditures for investment.  The differences 
among GPs are very large, however it is not possible a priori to determine whether GPs 
with large potential increases in investment revenues need more support to be able to 
absorb the new grant. In the limited evidence we have on current absorption of funds, 
there is no significant correlation between GPs with low per capita investment revenue 
and absorption rates.  Other factors such as training and personnel should also be 
considered in the support related to the application of the new grant versus simply 
considering the potential increase in discretionary expenditures. 
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Table 18:  Simulations of New Grant 
 
  
ALL GPs (rupees per capita) 
SAMPLE SRD and/or BRFG GPs (rupees per 
capita) 
 
Exhibit: Total 
Cost 
  
Average 
GP 
name 
change 
percent 
increase 
Average GP name change 
percent 
increase 
 of New Grant 
            
1. Current new investment Mean* 34    53      
discretionary revenues per capita Min * 32 Bankra III  10.1 Sammatinagar     
Conservative Assumptions (Table 15) Max * 101 Maszidpur  136.1 Jhamtia     
            
2.Current new investment Mean* 166    259      
discretionary revenues per capita Min * 54.6 Bankra III  65.6 Sammatinagar     
Liberal Assumptions (Table 17) Max * 457.5 Malangighi  477.8 Totopara     
            
3.New investment with additional Mean* 80  46 135.3 99  46 86.8   
$1 per capita Min * 78 Bankra III 46 144.0 56.1 Sammatinagar 46 460.0   
Conservative Assumptions Max * 147 Maszidpur 46 45.5 182.1 Jhamtia 46 33.8   
             
4.New investment with additional Mean* 212  46 27.7 305  46 17.8   
$1 per capita Min * 100.6 Bankra III 46 84.2 111.6 Sammatinagar 46 70.1   
Liberal Assumptions Max * 503.5 Malangighi 46 10.1 523.8 Totopara 46 9.6   
            
  EXHIBIT: TOTAL COST of $1 increase in grant for 
800 GPs            $    15,200,000  
  EXHIBIT: TOTAL COST of $1 increase in grants for all GPs         $    63,726,000  
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Table 18: (continued) 
 
  
ALL GPs (rupees per capita) 
SAMPLE SRD and/or BRFG GPs (rupees per 
capita) 
 
Exhibit: Total 
Cost 
  
Average 
GP 
name 
change 
percent 
increase 
Average GP name change 
percent 
increase 
 of New Grant 
            
5.New investment with additional Mean * 126  92 270.6 145  92 173.6   
$2 per capita Min * 124 Bankra III 92 288.0 102.1 Sammatinagar 92 910.9   
Conservative Assumptions Max * 193 Maszidpur 92 91.1 228.1 Jhamtia 92 67.6   
             
6.New investment with additional Mean * 258  92 55.4 351  92 35.5   
$2 per capita Min * 146.6 Bankra III 92 168.5 157.6 Sammatinagar 92 140.2   
Liberal Assumptions Max * 549.5 Malangighi 92 20.1 569.8 Totopara 92 19.3   
            
  EXHIBIT: TOTAL COST of $2 increase in grant for 
800 GPs            $    30,400,000  
  EXHIBIT: TOTAL COST of $2 increase in grants for all GPs         $  127,452,000  
            
Note: * Mean based on all GPs as reported in published data from PRDD, min and max based on non-SRD/BRG GPs in our sample.
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An additional issue to consider regarding the new grant is whether or not to include a 
revenue mobilization incentive to further expand GP expenditures.  This approach has 
been used in Karnataka as well as in Tamil Nadu and Goa (Subrahmanyam, 2004).  
Tying increased revenues to some form of mobilization would increase the accountability 
of the GPs over the longer run and also provide them with additional revenues.  In the 
cases of Thalia and Shyamsundar, if the revenue mobilization for property tax were 
increased from current reported levels (65 and 47 percent respectively) by 25 percent (to 
81 and 59 percent respectively—admittedly high targets), the additional revenue 
generated would increase own revenue collections by about 3.9 in Thalia and 0.9 percent 
in Shyamsundar.   
 
Can additional own source revenue be mobilized?  There seems to be room for increased 
mobilization based on interviews, past trends, and previous analyses (including GWOB 
2007).  However, the political will of governments to charge accordingly for government 
services is necessary for enhanced revenue mobilization.  Previous studies document a 
―willingness to pay‖ but an ―unwillingness to charge‖ for local public services (Mathur 
and Peterson, 2006, UNDP-World Bank, 1999, Datta, 2008).  Alignment of these two is 
important to increased revenue mobilization and the effective provision of public goods.   
 
The final section provides a summary of the findings of this report and some initial 
observations for the new grant based on the current state of PRI finances in West Bengal. 
 
 
 
Summary—Initial Observations on PRI Finances in the context of a new grant for 
improving service delivery 
 
The fiscal condition of the PRIs in West Bengal has shown growth since 2005 in terms of 
the level of expenditure and revenue flowing through the system.  The level of revenue 
has more than doubled overall, including the level of revenue for the GPs as have 
expenditures.  Own fund revenues and expenditures have also increased, but own fund 
revenues still remain at a relatively low level of 11 rupees per person.  Williams‘ analysis 
suggests that discretionary revenues (from own source and untied funds) are, on average, 
68 rupees per person in 2007-08 and the analysis presented in Tables 15-17 demonstrate 
that the actual discretion could be larger depending on how liberal an interpretation is 
used regarding ―discretion‖ and ―investment.‖ The growth in tied revenue sources was 
larger than untied sources over the last 3 years.  The relatively low level of untied 
revenues suggests that there is fiscal room for expanding the amount of untied revenues 
at the GP level.  Interviews and analysis of the sample GP finances suggest that GPs are 
able to plan and carry out additional expenditures that have an investment nature in 
water, education, health, and disaster management.  
 
There is no evidence of increased or decreased absorption of funds when considering tied 
revenues or untied revenues.  However, there appears to be a growth in the use of ―grass 
roots‖ decision making via the GUS.  In the sample GPs, more than 75 percent appear to 
have incorporated the GUS level in the budgeting process.  Technical assistance by the 
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PRDD and SRD show up in various areas including computerization of PRI data and 
institutionalization of the budget process.  An annual self-evaluation of the performance 
of GPs also focuses attention on the growth of GPs in terms of meeting needs of the 
population.  The PRDD has supplemented this with an incentive grant and four of the 
sample GPs were recipients. This technical assistance will enhance the ability of the 
PRDD to monitor and evaluate performance of the GPs, which is important in the context 
of expanding the grant system.  
 
A grant of $1 or $2 per capita would yield important increases in discretionary 
investment revenues.  In the sample analyzed here, the increases are on average between 
27 and 270 percent for increases of 46 and 92 rupees per capita.  To perform a detail 
simulation analysis of the impact of grants of that magnitude requires further refining of 
the GPMS.  The current format is very useful for analyzing individual GPs, but 
cumbersome for analyzing policy changes across all GPs due to some inconsistencies in 
variable definitions, reporting, and missing data. 
 
Based on the reviews and field work undertaken for this report, there are a number of 
initial observations we might make regarding the new grant system.  One suggestion is 
that the team think about continuing to provide a technical assistance component at the 
PRDD level that will not only help GPs attain specific benchmarks, but would increase 
the flow of information and the quality of information on PRI finances.  This technical 
assistance is in progress but for example, what we saw in the field was substantial 
variation in the competencies of the GP staff to use and update the financial management 
system.   
 
Here, we provide some initial observations regarding some components of that system, 
issues to be considered, and other technical assistance that could be designed around the 
new grant system.  The report for Task III presents more detailed options. 
 
 There have been a number of initiatives over the last decade focused furthering 
decentralization in India and in West Bengal.  These include the SRD initiative, 
BRFG, training and grant initiatives in other states such as Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka.  It would also be helpful to the development of the next grant system 
to put together a review of recent initiatives and assessment of their impacts.  
Pieces of this may be done but there does not seem to be a compendium, which 
would be very useful for beginning this new grant.  The State Institute of 
Panchayats and Rural Development (SIPRD) has the mandate to conduct such 
analyses, and its training and analyses are reported in the states Annual Report.  
However, the analyses such as those reported in the 2007-08 Annual Report Table 
5.10 do not appear to be widely disseminated.  In addition, the state might 
consider holding a roundtable with other states that have or are considering 
implementing grants that provide additional untied revenues to the GPs.  These 
states might include Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Goa.   
 
 The state offers a wide variety of technical assistance and training to the GPs in 
the areas of budgeting and financial management.  The Annual Report provides 
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some detail on these activities.  If the training could be categorized from very 
basic training in an area (say budgeting) to higher level training in the area, a 
condition for the new grant could be a GPs attendance at the various levels. 
 
 The development of the fiscal data system is critical to the ability of the state to 
evaluate its grant system (existing and new grants) and to monitor the impacts.  
Based on the limited sample of GPs interviewed for this report, some GPs need 
more help than is currently available to run the financial management system.
31
  
In addition, the PRDD might consider more standardization in the accounting and 
reporting of these data, given the experiences we faced with Forms 26 and 27 and 
the CCER.
32
  A statement from the GP regarding their level of integration of the 
GPMS system could be a condition for consideration for the new grant system. 
 
 At least one GP in our sample did not conform to the 2007 Accounts, Budget, and 
Audit Rules.  Use of the standards reported in that rules book might be a basic 
condition for consideration of the new grant system.   
 
 There is some variation in the distribution of expenditures among GPs even in 
terms of tied grants.  The 2007 GOWB study highlighted the distribution of per 
capita expenditures among the GPs.  It is interesting to consider whether we can 
learn something about absorption from GPs with higher (or lower) expenditures 
per capita.  Can we learn something about GP financial management from these 
GPs?  The outliers in expenditures per capita might be good candidates for the 
new grant. Using data from the 2007 GOWB study, on average, higher 
expenditures per capita are positively correlated with higher closing balances as a 
share of expenditures.  However, at higher levels of expenditures (greater than 50 
percent of the mean), there is no correlation between closing balances (or negative 
at higher levels of expenditures per capita). If PRDD has updated data on these 
expenditures by all GPs in the state, it would be useful to analyze similar issues 
related to absorption. 
 
 Over the last three years, the GPs have been authorized to increase the number of 
employees to include an engineer, account clerks, and data entry employees, 
among others.  In numerous GPs, these posts are unfilled, and the engineering 
post is the most often unfulfilled.  In 2007-08, 53 percent of these posts were 
unfilled.  Account clerks and data entry positions are among those with high 
vacancy rates.  If GPs are to expand their service delivery, they may be in dire 
                                               
31
 Bakshi and Okabe (2008) provide an interesting case study on data collection in Raina GP.  They find 
that the GP holds a variety of data that are not currently collected at a higher level of government.  In the 
field, we also heard that outcome measures of various schemes are not computerized, but are readily 
identified.  These include housing built, waitlists for houses, kilometers of roads cleared, etc.  These 
outcomes are shared with the higher levels of government (and some of this information is produced in the 
PRDD Annual Report), but the GPs expressed a need to get these data ―into the system.‖   
32
 Rajaraman and Si (2007) demonstrate how difficult analysis of the impact of decentralization is without 
standardization of fiscal data across the PRIs. 
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need of help in recruiting qualified candidates for these posts.  A component of 
the grant might include a way to incentivize important posts such as the engineer 
through higher salary (although this may not be possible within the law).    
 
 The development of tax administration appears to be lacking at the level of the 
GP.  To date, there really has been little incentive for GPs to develop their tax 
administration.  If the new grant system includes an incentive component, the 
state might consider upgrading training and assistance in the area tax 
administration and in particular, for property tax. 
 
These and other issues will also be discussed in the report for Task III.  In addition, data 
and information in this report will be updated to include the September field visits to four 
GPs, one block, and one district as well as information and clarifications gathered during 
the September meetings in West Bengal. 
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Table A1:  Activity Map Detail Function 4 Health and Family Welfare All components 
 
Function Activity Responsibility of Standing Committees of three-tier PRIs 
   
   Zilla Parishad:  Chief 
Medical Officer of 
Health 
 Panchayat Samiti: 
Block:   Block Medical 
Officer of Health  
 Gram Panchayat: Health 
Supervisor 
   
Improvement in 
Infrastructure 
Upgrading 
facilities at Sub-
center 
 Civil works for 
improvement of 
infrastructure  (large 
size outlay) 
 Maintenance and 
upgradation of BPHC 
and PHC  
 Maintenance and upgradation 
of Sub-centers  
   
Supply of 
Materials 
Procuring 
materials and 
distribution 
 Fund allotment 
 Lifting of materials 
from State Hqtrs and 
supply to different 
block 
 Supervision and 
monitoring of 
utilization of funds and 
materials by BPHCs 
and PHCs 
 Local Purchase of non-
medical items required 
by the PHCs and 
BPHCs as may be 
authorized by H&FW 
Department 
 Supervision and monitoring of 
utilization of funds and 
materials by Sub-centers 
 Local Purchase of non-medical 
items required by the sub-
centers as may be authorized 
by H&FW Department 
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